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On the efficiency of the first price auction

Author

Listed:
  • Hernando-Veciana, Ángel
  • Michelucci, Fabio

Abstract

We provide a natural setting in privatizations in which the equilibrium of the first price auction gives greater expected surplus than any equilibrium of the open ascending auction.

Suggested Citation

  • Hernando-Veciana, Ángel & Michelucci, Fabio, 2017. "On the efficiency of the first price auction," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 159-161.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:156:y:2017:i:c:p:159-161
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.05.003
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lebrun, Bernard, 2006. "Uniqueness of the equilibrium in first-price auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 131-151, April.
    2. Eric Maskin & John Riley, 2000. "Asymmetric Auctions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 67(3), pages 413-438.
    3. Krishna, Vijay, 2003. "Asymmetric English auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 112(2), pages 261-288, October.
    4. Matthews, Steven A., 1983. "Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 370-400, August.
    5. Riley, John G & Samuelson, William F, 1981. "Optimal Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 381-392, June.
    6. Holt, Charles A, Jr, 1980. "Competitive Bidding for Contracts under Alternative Auction Procedures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(3), pages 433-445, June.
    7. Maskin, Eric S & Riley, John G, 1984. "Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1473-1518, November.
    8. Hernando-Veciana, Ángel & Michelucci, Fabio, 2011. "Second best efficiency and the English auction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 496-506.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Efficiency; First price auction; English auction; Privatizations;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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