IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/compec/v32y2008i3p245-278.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Numerical Solutions of Asymmetric, First-Price, Independent Private Values Auctions

Author

Listed:
  • Wayne-Roy Gayle
  • Jean Richard

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Wayne-Roy Gayle & Jean Richard, 2008. "Numerical Solutions of Asymmetric, First-Price, Independent Private Values Auctions," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 32(3), pages 245-278, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:compec:v:32:y:2008:i:3:p:245-278
    DOI: 10.1007/s10614-008-9125-7
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10614-008-9125-7
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s10614-008-9125-7?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Patrick Bajari, 2001. "Comparing competition and collusion: a numerical approach," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 18(1), pages 187-205.
    2. Marshall Robert C. & Meurer Michael J. & Richard Jean-Francois & Stromquist Walter, 1994. "Numerical Analysis of Asymmetric First Price Auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 193-220, September.
    3. Eric Maskin & John Riley, 2000. "Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 67(3), pages 439-454.
    4. Marshall, Robert C. & Marx, Leslie M., 2007. "Bidder collusion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 374-402, March.
    5. Riley, John G & Samuelson, William F, 1981. "Optimal Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 381-392, June.
    6. Donald, Stephen G. & Paarsch, Harry J., 1996. "Identification, Estimation, and Testing in Parametric Empirical Models of Auctions within the Independent Private Values Paradigm," Econometric Theory, Cambridge University Press, vol. 12(3), pages 517-567, August.
    7. Matthews, Steven A., 1983. "Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 370-400, August.
    8. Lebrun, Bernard, 1996. "Existence of an Equilibrium in First Price Auctions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(3), pages 421-443, April.
    9. Maskin, Eric S & Riley, John G, 1984. "Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1473-1518, November.
    10. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Ossard, Herve & Vuong, Quang, 1995. "Econometrics of First-Price Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(4), pages 953-980, July.
    11. Lebrun, Bernard, 2006. "Uniqueness of the equilibrium in first-price auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 131-151, April.
    12. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
    13. Lebrun, Bernard, 1999. "First Price Auctions in the Asymmetric N Bidder Case," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 40(1), pages 125-142, February.
    14. Athey, Susan, 2001. "Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(4), pages 861-889, July.
    15. Florens, F. & Protopopescu, C. & Richard, J.-F., 1998. "Identification and Estimation of a Game Theoretic Models," Papers 98.499, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Fibich, Gadi & Gavish, Nir, 2011. "Numerical simulations of asymmetric first-price auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 479-495.
    2. Zhu Mingxi & Song Michelle, 2024. "Design Information Disclosure under Bidder Heterogeneity in Online Advertising Auctions: Implications of Bid-Adherence Behavior," Papers 2410.05535, arXiv.org.
    3. Doni Nicola & Menicucci Domenico, 2013. "Revenue Comparison in Asymmetric Auctions with Discrete Valuations," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 13(1), pages 429-461, September.
    4. Rieck, Thomas, 2010. "Signaling in First-Price Auctions," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 18/2010, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
    5. Ceesay Muhammed, 2024. "Collusion with Not-So-Secret Rings," Journal of Quantitative Economics, Springer;The Indian Econometric Society (TIES), vol. 22(2), pages 563-570, June.
    6. Lagerlof, Johan, 2012. "Does Cost Uncertainty in the Bertrand Model Soften Competition?," CEPR Discussion Papers 8817, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Lorentziadis, Panos L., 2020. "Competitive bidding in asymmetric multidimensional public procurement," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 282(1), pages 211-220.
    8. Aryal, Gaurab & Gabrielli, Maria F., 2013. "Testing for collusion in asymmetric first-price auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 26-35.
    9. Kirkegaard, René, 2014. "Ranking asymmetric auctions: Filling the gap between a distributional shift and stretch," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 60-69.
    10. Kirkegaard, René, 2009. "Asymmetric first price auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1617-1635, July.
    11. Muhammad Ejaz & Stephen Joe & Chaitanya Joshi, 2021. "Adversarial Risk Analysis for Auctions Using Mirror Equilibrium and Bayes Nash Equilibrium," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 18(3), pages 185-202, September.
    12. Kotowski, Maciej H., 2018. "On asymmetric reserve prices," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(1), January.
    13. Hu Fu & Tao Lin, 2020. "Learning Utilities and Equilibria in Non-Truthful Auctions," Papers 2007.01722, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2022.
    14. Javier Castro & Rosa Espínola & Inmaculada Gutiérrez & Daniel Gómez, 2023. "Auctions: A New Method for Selling Objects with Bimodal Density Functions," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 61(4), pages 1707-1743, April.
    15. Gadi Fibich & Nir Gavish, 2012. "Asymmetric First-Price Auctions---A Dynamical-Systems Approach," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 37(2), pages 219-243, May.
    16. Giuseppe Lopomo & Leslie Marx & Peng Sun, 2011. "Bidder collusion at first-price auctions," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 15(3), pages 177-211, September.
    17. Wayne-Roy Gayle & Robert Marshall & Leslie Marx & Jean-François Richard, 2011. "Coordinated Effects in the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 39(1), pages 39-56, August.
    18. Arieh Gavious & Yizhaq Minchuk, 2014. "Ranking asymmetric auctions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(2), pages 369-393, May.
    19. Timothy Hubbard & René Kirkegaard & Harry Paarsch, 2013. "Using Economic Theory to Guide Numerical Analysis: Solving for Equilibria in Models of Asymmetric First-Price Auctions," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 42(2), pages 241-266, August.
    20. Josheski Dushko & Apostolov Mico, 2023. "The Prospect Theory and First Price Auctions: an Explanation of Overbidding," Econometrics. Advances in Applied Data Analysis, Sciendo, vol. 27(1), pages 33-74, March.
    21. Zincenko, Federico, 2024. "Estimation and inference of seller’s expected revenue in first-price auctions," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 241(1).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Lorentziadis, Panos L., 2016. "Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 248(2), pages 347-371.
    2. Li, Huagang & Riley, John G., 2007. "Auction choice," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(6), pages 1269-1298, December.
    3. Lebrun, Bernard, 2006. "Uniqueness of the equilibrium in first-price auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 131-151, April.
    4. Marshall, Robert C. & Marx, Leslie M., 2007. "Bidder collusion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 374-402, March.
    5. Jofre-Bonet, Mireia & Pesendorfer, Martin, 2014. "Optimal sequential auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 61-71.
    6. Hickman Brent R. & Hubbard Timothy P. & Sağlam Yiğit, 2012. "Structural Econometric Methods in Auctions: A Guide to the Literature," Journal of Econometric Methods, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 67-106, August.
    7. Cantillon, Estelle, 2008. "The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 1-25, January.
    8. Kaplan, Todd R. & Zamir, Shmuel, 2015. "Advances in Auctions," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    9. Kirkegaard, René, 2009. "Asymmetric first price auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1617-1635, July.
    10. Mares, Vlad & Swinkels, Jeroen M., 2014. "On the analysis of asymmetric first price auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 1-40.
    11. Lebrun, Bernard, 1998. "Comparative Statics in First Price Auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 97-110, October.
    12. Fibich, Gadi & Gavious, Arieh & Sela, Aner, 2004. "Revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 115(2), pages 309-321, April.
    13. Quang Vuong & Sandra Campo & Isabelle Perrigne, 2003. "Asymmetry in first-price auctions with affiliated private values," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 18(2), pages 179-207.
    14. Timothy P. Hubbard & Harry J. Paarsch, 2012. "On the Numerical Solution of Equilibria in Auction Models with Asymmetries within the Private-Values Paradigm," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 291, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
    15. Xi Chen & Binghui Peng, 2023. "Complexity of Equilibria in First-Price Auctions under General Tie-Breaking Rules," Papers 2303.16388, arXiv.org.
    16. Leandro Arozamena & Estelle Cantillon, 2004. "Investment Incentives in Procurement Auctions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 71(1), pages 1-18.
    17. Rene Kirkegaard, 2005. "A Simple Approach to Analyzing Asymmetric First Price Auctions," Working Papers 0504, Brock University, Department of Economics, revised Nov 2005.
    18. Lamy, Laurent, 2012. "The econometrics of auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 167(1), pages 113-132.
    19. Hu, Audrey & Offerman, Theo & Zou, Liang, 2011. "Premium auctions and risk preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(6), pages 2420-2439.
    20. Harry J. Paarsch & Bjarne Brendstrup, 2004. "Nonparametric Identification and Estimation of Multi-Unit, Sequential, Oral, Ascending-Price Auctions with Asymmetric Bidders," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 2, Econometric Society.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:compec:v:32:y:2008:i:3:p:245-278. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.