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Adapting to climate change: Is cooperation good for the environment?

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  • Masoudi, Nahid
  • Zaccour, Georges

Abstract

We consider the formation of an international environmental agreement focusing on adaptation to climate change. Members of the agreement fully share their knowledge and determine their investments in R&D by maximizing their joint welfare, while non-members optimize their individual payoffs. Using a three-stage game formalism, we obtain that a large coalition is achievable and that total emissions increase with the size of the agreement. The welfare implications are parameter dependent.

Suggested Citation

  • Masoudi, Nahid & Zaccour, Georges, 2017. "Adapting to climate change: Is cooperation good for the environment?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 1-5.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:153:y:2017:i:c:p:1-5
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.01.018
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. d'Aspremont, Claude & Jacquemin, Alexis, 1988. "Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Duopoly with Spillovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 1133-1137, December.
    2. Lazkano, Itziar & Marrouch, Walid & Nkuiya, Bruno, 2016. "Adaptation to climate change: how does heterogeneity in adaptation costs affect climate coalitions?," Environment and Development Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 21(6), pages 812-838, December.
    3. Claude d'Aspremont & Alexis Jacquemin & Jean Jaskold Gabszewicz & John A. Weymark, 1983. "On the Stability of Collusive Price Leadership," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 16(1), pages 17-25, February.
    4. Marrouch, Walid & Ray Chaudhuri, Amrita, 2016. "International Environmental Agreements: Doomed to Fail or Destined to Succeed? A Review of the Literature," International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics, now publishers, vol. 9(3-4), pages 245-319, September.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Basak Bayramoglu & Jean-François Jacques & Sylvaine Poret, 2023. "Nutrition and Climate Policies in the European Union: Friends or Enemies?," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 86(4), pages 807-849, December.
    2. Rubio, Santiago J., 2018. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements: Adaptation and Complementarity," ETA: Economic Theory and Applications 276179, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    3. Mao, Liang, 2017. "Designing International Environmental Agreements under Participation Uncertainty," MPRA Paper 86248, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Miguel Borrero & Santiago J. Rubio, 2022. "An adaptation-mitigation game: does adaptation promote participation in international environmental agreements?," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 439-479, September.
    5. Mao, Liang, 2020. "Designing international environmental agreements under participation uncertainty," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).
    6. Chiara Donnini & Armando Sacco, 2024. "Social equity in international environmental agreements," Journal of Global Optimization, Springer, vol. 90(1), pages 261-291, September.
    7. Takashima, Nobuyuki, 2023. "Self-enforcing international environmental agreements with third-party organizations: Initial payment, technological development, and refunding," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 228(C).
    8. Rohrer, Anna Viktoria & Rubio, Santiago J., 2024. "The strategic role of adaptation in international environmental agreements," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 124(C).
    9. Michèle Breton & Lucia Sbragia, 2019. "The Impact of Adaptation on the Stability of International Environmental Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 74(2), pages 697-725, October.
    10. Mao, Liang, 2017. "Designing International Environmental Agreements under Participation Uncertainty," MPRA Paper 79145, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Kuzyutin, Denis & Smirnova, Nadezhda, 2023. "A dynamic multicriteria game of renewable resource extraction with environmentally concerned players," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 226(C).
    12. E, Jiaqiang & Pham, Minhhieu & Zhao, D. & Deng, Yuanwang & Le, DucHieu & Zuo, Wei & Zhu, Hao & Liu, Teng & Peng, Qingguo & Zhang, Zhiqing, 2017. "Effect of different technologies on combustion and emissions of the diesel engine fueled with biodiesel: A review," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 620-647.
    13. Xiao, Lu & Liu, Jianyue & Ge, Jinwen, 2021. "Dynamic game in agriculture and industry cross-sectoral water pollution governance in developing countries," Agricultural Water Management, Elsevier, vol. 243(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    International environmental agreement; Climate change; Adaptation; R&D; Spillover;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • Q55 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Technological Innovation

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