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An experiment on behavior in social learning games with collective preferences

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  • Davis, Brent J.

Abstract

Many environments with social learning involve payoff interdependencies. Until recently, few studies have examined sequentially observational social learning environments with externalities. This paper presents the results of an experiment that examines the theoretical predictions of a simple model of observational learning where individuals care about their own actions and the actions of others (Ali and Kartik, 2012). Consistent with theory, I find that behavior does not change with this class of payoff interdependencies. However, behavior deviates from equilibrium predictions in the same manner both with and without these interdependencies.

Suggested Citation

  • Davis, Brent J., 2017. "An experiment on behavior in social learning games with collective preferences," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 93-95.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:152:y:2017:i:c:p:93-95
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.01.015
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Diefeng Peng & Yulei Rao & Xianming Sun & Erte Xiao, 2019. "Optional Disclosure and Observational Learning," Monash Economics Working Papers 05-18, Monash University, Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Herding; Information cascades; Lab experiments; Social learning; Payoff interdependence;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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