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Do financial advisor commissions distort client choice?

Author

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  • Beyer, Max
  • de Meza, David
  • Reyniers, Diane

Abstract

This experiment shows that varying the commission received by financial advisors strongly influences insurance purchase.

Suggested Citation

  • Beyer, Max & de Meza, David & Reyniers, Diane, 2013. "Do financial advisor commissions distort client choice?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 119(2), pages 117-119.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:119:y:2013:i:2:p:117-119
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.01.026
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Utpal Bhattacharya & Andreas Hackethal & Simon Kaesler & Benjamin Loos & Steffen Meyer, 2012. "Is Unbiased Financial Advice to Retail Investors Sufficient? Answers from a Large Field Study," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 25(4), pages 975-1032.
    2. Susan E. K. Christoffersen & Richard Evans & David K. Musto, 2013. "What Do Consumers’ Fund Flows Maximize? Evidence from Their Brokers’ Incentives," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 68(1), pages 201-235, February.
    3. Chalmers, John & Reuter, Jonathan, 2020. "Is conflicted investment advice better than no advice?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 138(2), pages 366-387.
    4. Sendhil Mullainathan & Markus Noeth & Antoinette Schoar, 2012. "The Market for Financial Advice: An Audit Study," NBER Working Papers 17929, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Roman Inderst & Marco Ottaviani, 2009. "Misselling through Agents," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(3), pages 883-908, June.
    6. Daylian M. Cain & George Loewenstein & Don A. Moore, 2011. "When Sunlight Fails to Disinfect: Understanding the Perverse Effects of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest," Journal of Consumer Research, Journal of Consumer Research Inc., vol. 37(5), pages 836-857.
    7. Daylian M. Cain & George Loewenstein & Don A. Moore, 2005. "The Dirt on Coming Clean: Perverse Effects of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(1), pages 1-25, January.
    8. Daniel Bergstresser & John M. R. Chalmers & Peter Tufano, 2009. "Assessing the Costs and Benefits of Brokers in the Mutual Fund Industry," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(10), pages 4129-4156, October.
    9. Inderst, Roman, 2010. "Misselling (financial) products: The limits for internal compliance," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 106(1), pages 35-37, January.
    10. de Meza, David Emmanuel & Irlenbusch, Bernd & Reyniers, Diane, 2010. "Disclosure, Trust and Persuasion in Insurance Markets," IZA Discussion Papers 5060, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Ghafoori, Eraj & Ip, Edwin & Kabátek, Jan, 2021. "The impacts of a large-scale financial education intervention on retirement saving behaviors and portfolio allocation: Evidence from pension fund data," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 130(C).
    2. Sane, Renuka & Halan, Monika, 2017. "Misled and mis-sold: financial misbehaviour in retail banks?," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 429-444.
    3. Mietzner, Mark & Molterer, Manuel, 2018. "You might not get what you need: The discrepancy between financial advice and commissions in Germany," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 167-170.
    4. Felix Gottschalk, 2021. "Regulating Markets with Advice: An Experimental Study," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 83(1), pages 1-31, February.
    5. Reurink, Arjan, 2016. "Financial fraud: A literature review," MPIfG Discussion Paper 16/5, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    6. Shinozawa, Yoshikatsu & Vivian, Andrew, 2015. "Determinants of money flows into investment trusts in Japan," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 138-161.
    7. Johannes G. Jaspersen, 2016. "Hypothetical Surveys And Experimental Studies Of Insurance Demand: A Review," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 83(1), pages 217-255, January.
    8. Paul Chen & Martin Richardson, 2019. "Conflict of Interest, Disclosure and Vertical Relationships: An Experimental Analysis," Economic Papers, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 38(3), pages 167-181, September.
    9. Lynn, Peter & Fumagalli, Laura & Muñoz-Bugarin, Jair, 2021. "Investigating the role of debt advice on borrowers’ well-being. An encouragement study on a new sample of over-indebted people in Britain," ISER Working Paper Series 2021-08, Institute for Social and Economic Research.
    10. Jeremy Burke & Angela A. Hung & Jack Clift & Steven Garber & Joanne K. Yoong, 2015. "Impacts of Conflicts of Interest in the Financial Services Industry," Working Papers WR-1076, RAND Corporation.
    11. Doron Samuell & Demetris Christodoulou, 2024. "Lower disclosures from customers screened by financial advisors," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 91(1), pages 93-120, March.
    12. Bernardita Vial & Pilar Alcalde, 2020. "Intermediary Commissions in a Regulated Market with Heterogeneous Customers," Documentos de Trabajo 532, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
    13. Sandhu, Harsimran & Deb, Soumya Guha, 2024. "Ethical dimensions of bank-distributed mutual funds," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 238(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Commission selling; Financial advisor; Consumer bias;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G02 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Behavioral Finance: Underlying Principles
    • G1 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets
    • G11 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
    • G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage

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