Using clock auctions to dissolve partnership: An experimental study
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.12.034
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Yu, Ning & Chmura, Thorsten & Pitz, Thomas & Sun, Ning, 2010. "Bargaining over perfect complements owned separately: With experimental test," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 115-118, May.
- Cramton, Peter & Gibbons, Robert & Klemperer, Paul, 1987.
"Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(3), pages 615-632, May.
- Peter Cramton & Robert Gibbons & Paul Klemperer, 1985. "Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently," Working papers 406, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Peter Cramton & Robert Gibbons & Paul Klemperer, 1987. "Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently," Papers of Peter Cramton 87econ, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Jun 1998.
- Kagel, John H & Levin, Dan, 1993.
"Independent Private Value Auctions: Bidder Behaviour in First-, Second- and Third-Price Auctions with Varying Numbers of Bidders,"
Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 103(419), pages 868-879, July.
- Kagel, J.H. & Levin, D., 1988. "Independent Private Value Auctions: Bidder Behavior In First, Second And Third-Price Auctions With Varying Numbers Of Bidders," Papers 13, Houston - Department of Economics.
- DavidJ. Cooper & Hanming Fang, 2008.
"Understanding Overbidding In Second Price Auctions: An Experimental Study,"
Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(532), pages 1572-1595, October.
- David J. Cooper & Hanming Fang, 2008. "Understanding Overbidding in Second Price Auctions: An Experimental Study," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(532), pages 1572-1595, October.
- David J. Cooper & Hanming Fang, 2006. "Understanding Overbidding in Second Price Auctions: An Experimental Study," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1557, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Asen Ivanov & Dan Levin & Muriel Niederle, 2010.
"Can Relaxation of Beliefs Rationalize the Winner's Curse?: An Experimental Study,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(4), pages 1435-1452, July.
- Asen Ivanov & Dan Levin & Muriel Niederle, "undated". "Can Relaxation of Beliefs Rationalize the Winner’s Curse?: An Experimental Study," Working Papers 0803, VCU School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982.
"A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
- Paul Milgrom & Robert J. Weber, 1981. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Discussion Papers 447R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Yuri Khoroshilov, 2018. "Partnership Dissolution: Information and Efficiency+," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 15(3), pages 133-138, September.
- Ludwig Ensthaler & Thomas Giebe & Jianpei Li, 2014. "Speculative partnership dissolution with auctions," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 18(2), pages 127-150, June.
- Oechssler, Jörg & Roomets, Alex, 2023. "Dissolving an ambiguous partnership," Working Papers 0733, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
- Hyndman, Kyle, 2021. "Dissolving partnerships under risk: An experimental investigation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 185(C), pages 702-720.
- Balzer, Benjamin & Rosato, Antonio & von Wangenheim, Jonas, 2022.
"Dutch vs. first-price auctions with expectations-based loss-averse bidders,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 205(C).
- Benjamin Balzer & Antonio Rosato & Jonas von Wangenheim, 2021. "Dutch vs. First-Price Auctions With Expectations-Based Loss-Averse Bidders," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2021_314, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Mariano Gabriel Runco, 2020. "Reference-Dependent Preferences and Overbidding in Private and Common Value Auctions," International Journal of Applied Behavioral Economics (IJABE), IGI Global, vol. 9(2), pages 20-37, April.
- Andrej Woerner & Sander Onderstal & Arthur Schram, 2022.
"Comparing Crowdfunding Mechanisms: Introducing the Generalized Moulin-Shenker Mechanism,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
10081, CESifo.
- Andrej Woerner & Sander Onderstal & Arthur Schram, 2023. "Comparing Crowdfunding Mechanisms: Introducing the Generalized Moulin-Shenker Mechanism," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 464, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
- Andrej Woerner & Sander Onderstal & Arthur Schram, 2022.
"Comparing Crowdfunding Mechanisms: Introducing the Generalized Moulin-Shenker Mechanism,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
10081, CESifo.
- Andrej Woerner & Sander Onderstal & Arthur Schram, 2022. "Comparing Crowdfunding Mechanisms: Introducing the Generalized Moulin-Shenker Mechanism," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 22-084/I, Tinbergen Institute.
- Podwol, Joseph Uri & Schneider, Henry S., 2016. "Nonstandard bidder behavior in real-world auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 198-212.
- Olena Myrna, 2022. "Lower price increases, the bounded rationality of bidders, and underbidding concerns in online agricultural land auctions: The Ukrainian case," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 73(3), pages 826-844, September.
- Matteo Migheli, 2017. "The winner’s curse in auctions with losses," Mind & Society: Cognitive Studies in Economics and Social Sciences, Springer;Fondazione Rosselli, vol. 16(1), pages 113-126, November.
- Breitmoser, Yves, 2019.
"Knowing me, imagining you: Projection and overbidding in auctions,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 423-447.
- Breitmoser, Yves, 2015. "Knowing me, imagining you: Projection and overbidding in auctions," MPRA Paper 62052, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Breitmoser, Yves, 2016. "Knowing me, imagining you: Projection and overbidding in auctions," MPRA Paper 68981, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Breitmoser, Yves, 2015. "Knowing me, imagining you: Projection and overbidding in auctions," VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 113160, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Mark Isaac & Svetlana Pevnitskaya & Kurt S. Schnier, 2012.
"Individual Behavior And Bidding Heterogeneity In Sealed Bid Auctions Where The Number Of Bidders Is Unknown,"
Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 50(2), pages 516-533, April.
- R. Mark Isaac & Svetlana Pevnitskaya & Kurt Schnier, 2008. "Individual Behaavior and Bidding Heterogeneity in Sealed Bid Auctions Where the Number of Bidders is Unknown," Working Papers wp2008_07_02, Department of Economics, Florida State University.
- Axel Ockenfels & David Reiley & Abdolkarim Sadrieh, 2006. "Online Auctions," NBER Working Papers 12785, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Fieseler, Karsten & Kittsteiner, Thomas & Moldovanu, Benny, 2003.
"Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 113(2), pages 223-234, December.
- Moldovanu, Benny & Fieseler, Karsten & Kittsteiner, Thomas, 1999. "Partnerships, Lemons and Efficient Trade," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 01-18, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
- Fieseler, Karsten & Kittsteiner, Thomas & Moldovanu, Benny, 1999. "Partnerships, lemons and efficient trade," Papers 99-71, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
- Fieseler, Karsten & Kittsteiner, Thomas & Moldovanu, Benny, 1999. "Partnerships, Lemons and Efficient Trade," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 99-71, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
- Maurizio Canavari & Andreas C. Drichoutis & Jayson L. Lusk & Rodolfo M. Nayga, Jr., 2018.
"How to run an experimental auction: A review of recent advances,"
Working Papers
2018-5, Agricultural University of Athens, Department Of Agricultural Economics.
- Canavari, Maurizio & Drichoutis, Andreas C. & Lusk, Jayson L. & Nayga, Rodolfo, 2018. "How to run an experimental auction: A review of recent advances," MPRA Paper 89715, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Drichoutis, Andreas C. & Nayga, Rodolfo M. & Lusk, Jayson L. & Lazaridis, Panagiotis, 2012.
"When a risky prospect is valued more than its best possible outcome,"
Judgment and Decision Making, Cambridge University Press, vol. 7(1), pages 1-18, January.
- Andreas C. Drichoutis & Rodolfo M. Nayga & Jayson L. Lusk & Panagiotis Lazaridis, 2012. "When a risky prospect is valued more than its best possible outcome," Judgment and Decision Making, Society for Judgment and Decision Making, vol. 7(1), pages 1-18, January.
- Andreas C. Drichoutis & Rodolfo M. Nayga, Jr. & Jayson L. Lusk & Panagiotis Lazaridis, 2009. "When a risky prospect is valued more than its best possible outcome," Working Papers 2009-12, Agricultural University of Athens, Department Of Agricultural Economics.
- Ulrike Malmendier & Young Han Lee, 2011.
"The Bidder's Curse,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(2), pages 749-787, April.
- Young Han Lee & Ulrike Malmendier, 2007. "The Bidder's Curse," NBER Working Papers 13699, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Crawford, VP, 2014. "Boundedly rational versus optimization-based models of strategic thinking and learning in games," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt04h694rz, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Gabuthy, Yannick & Jacquemet, Nicolas & Marchand, Nadège, 2008.
"Does resorting to online dispute resolution promote agreements? Experimental evidence,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 259-282, February.
- Yannick Gabuthy & Nicolas Jacquemet & Nadège Marchand, 2008. "Does Resorting to Online Dispute Resolution Promote Agreements ? Experimental Evidence," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00259453, HAL.
- Yannick Gabuthy & Nicolas Jacquemet & Nadège Marchand, 2008. "Does Resorting to Online Dispute Resolution Promote Agreements ? Experimental Evidence," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-00259453, HAL.
- Yannick Gabuthy & Nicolas Jacquemet & Nadège Marchand, 2008. "Does Resorting to Online Dispute Resolution Promote Agreements ? Experimental Evidence," Post-Print halshs-00259453, HAL.
- Bulow, Jeremy & Klemperer, Paul, 1994.
"Rational Frenzies and Crashes,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(1), pages 1-23, February.
- Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, 1991. "Rational Frenzies and Crashes," NBER Technical Working Papers 0112, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bulow, Jeremy I. & Klemperer, Paul, 1991. "Rational Frenzies and Crashes," CEPR Discussion Papers 593, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Breitmoser, Yves & Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Sebastian, 2019.
"Obviousness Around the Clock,"
Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series
151, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
- Breitmoser, Yves & Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Sebastian, 2019. "Obviousness around the clock," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2019-203, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
- Takehito Masuda & Ryo Mikami & Toyotaka Sakai & Shigehiro Serizawa & Takuma Wakayama, 2022.
"The net effect of advice on strategy-proof mechanisms: an experiment for the Vickrey auction,"
Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 25(3), pages 902-941, June.
- Takehito Masuda & Ryo Mikami & Toyotaka Sakai & Shigehiro Serizawa & Takuma Wakayama, 2020. "The net effect of advice on strategy-proof mechanisms: An experiment for the Vickrey auction," ISER Discussion Paper 1109rr, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Oct 2021.
- Andreoni, James & Che, Yeon-Koo & Kim, Jinwoo, 2007.
"Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions: An experiment,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 240-259, May.
- James Andreoni & Yeon-Koo Che & Jinwoo Kim, 2005. "Asymmetric Information about Rivals’ Types in Standard Auctions: An Experiment," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000474, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Andreoni,J. & Che,Y.-K. & Kim,J., 2006. "Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions : an experiment," Working papers 6, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- James Andreoni & Yeon-Koo Che & Jinwoo Kim, 2006. "Asymmetric Information about Rivals’ Types in Standard Auctions: An Experiment," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000293, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Ji Yong Lee & Rodolfo M. Nayga & Cary Deck & Andreas C. Drichoutis, 2020.
"Cognitive Ability and Bidding Behavior in Second Price Auctions: An Experimental Study,"
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 102(5), pages 1494-1510, October.
- Ji Yong Lee & Rodolfo M. Nayga, Jr & Cary Deck & Andreas Drichoutis, 2017. "Cognitive Ability and Bidding Behavior in Second Price Auctions: An Experimental Study," Working Papers 2017-3, Agricultural University of Athens, Department Of Agricultural Economics.
- Lee, Ji Yong & Nayga, Rodolfo & Deck, Cary & Drichoutis, Andreas C., 2017. "Cognitive Ability and Bidding Behavior in Second Price Auctions: An Experimental Study," MPRA Paper 81495, University Library of Munich, Germany.
More about this item
Keywords
Partnership dissolution; Clock auction; Risk aversion;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:119:y:2013:i:1:p:55-59. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.