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An empirical investigation of late bidding in online auctions

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  • Ben Rhouma, Tarek
  • Zaccour, Georges

Abstract

Why do some participants in online auctions place their bids right before the time of closing? Using e-Bay data, we propose count-data models to look at both the presence of the late-bidding phenomenon and its intensity. Our results reveal significant differences between extremely late-bidders (snipers) and moderately late-bidders.

Suggested Citation

  • Ben Rhouma, Tarek & Zaccour, Georges, 2012. "An empirical investigation of late bidding in online auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(3), pages 715-717.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:117:y:2012:i:3:p:715-717
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.022
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jeffrey C. Ely & Tanjim Hossain, 2009. "Sniping and Squatting in Auction Markets," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 1(2), pages 68-94, August.
    2. Alvin E. Roth & Axel Ockenfels, 2002. "Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon Auctions on the Internet," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1093-1103, September.
    3. Ladislav Wintr, 2008. "Some Evidence On Late Bidding In Ebay Auctions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 46(3), pages 369-379, July.
    4. Ockenfels, Axel & Roth, Alvin E., 2006. "Late and multiple bidding in second price Internet auctions: Theory and evidence concerning different rules for ending an auction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 297-320, May.
    5. Rainer Winkelmann, 2008. "Econometric Analysis of Count Data," Springer Books, Springer, edition 0, number 978-3-540-78389-3, June.
    6. Dan Ariely & Axel Ockenfels & Alvin E. Roth, 2005. "An Experimental Analysis of Ending Rules in Internet Auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(4), pages 890-907, Winter.
    7. Elfenbein, Daniel W. & McManus, Brian, 2010. "Last-minute bidding in eBay charity auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 107(1), pages 42-45, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Zakonnik Łukasz & Czerwonka Piotr & Zajdel Radosław, 2022. "Online Auctions End Time and its Impact on Sales Success – Analysis of the Odds Ratio on a Selected Central European Market," Folia Oeconomica Stetinensia, Sciendo, vol. 22(2), pages 246-264, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Late bidding; Internet auctions; EBay; Count models;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
    • L8 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services

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