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Auctions with a random number of identical bidders

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  • Haviv, Moshe
  • Milchtaich, Igal

Abstract

We examine and compare the (normally, mixed) symmetric equilibrium bidding strategies in first-price and all-pay common value multiple item auctions with a random number of bidders, who only seek one of the identical items and have the same budget.

Suggested Citation

  • Haviv, Moshe & Milchtaich, Igal, 2012. "Auctions with a random number of identical bidders," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 114(2), pages 143-146.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:114:y:2012:i:2:p:143-146
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.09.016
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. McAfee, R. Preston & McMillan, John, 1987. "Auctions with a stochastic number of bidders," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 1-19, October.
    2. Milchtaich, Igal, 2004. "Random-player games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 353-388, May.
    3. Levin, Dan & Smith, James L, 1994. "Equilibrium in Auctions with Entry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 585-599, June.
    4. Levin, Dan & Ozdenoren, Emre, 2004. "Auctions with uncertain numbers of bidders," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 118(2), pages 229-251, October.
    5. Harstad, Ronald M. & Kagel, John H. & Levin, Dan, 1990. "Equilibrium bid functions for auctions with an uncertain number of bidders," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 35-40, May.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Hillenbrand, Adrian & Winter, Fabian, 2018. "Volunteering under population uncertainty," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 65-81.
    2. Moshe Haviv & Binyamin Oz, 2021. "A busy period approach to some queueing games," Queueing Systems: Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 97(3), pages 261-277, April.
    3. Liron Ravner & Yutaka Sakuma, 2021. "Strategic arrivals to a queue with service rate uncertainty," Queueing Systems: Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 97(3), pages 303-341, April.
    4. Luis Briceño-Arias & José R. Correa & Andrés Perlroth, 2017. "Optimal Continuous Pricing with Strategic Consumers," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 63(8), pages 2741-2755, August.
    5. Ravner, Liron, 2014. "Equilibrium arrival times to a queue with order penalties," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 239(2), pages 456-468.
    6. Moshe Haviv & Liron Ravner, 2021. "A survey of queueing systems with strategic timing of arrivals," Queueing Systems: Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 99(1), pages 163-198, October.
    7. Moshe Haviv & Liron Ravner, 2014. "Strategic timing of arrivals to a finite queue multi-server loss system," Discussion Paper Series dp675, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    8. Alon, Tzvi & Haviv, Moshe, 2022. "Discrete-time strategic job arrivals to a single machine with waiting and lateness penalties," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 303(1), pages 480-486.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Auctions; Stochastic number of bidders; Random-player games; Identical bidders; Symmetric equilibrium;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design

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