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Expanding the solution set: Organizational economics and agri-environmental policy

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  • Steele, Scott R.

Abstract

The market failure paradigm dominates agri-environmental research and policy. Organizational economics provides an alternative framework for analyzing agri-environmental problems and points to alternative solutions. In this paper, the traditional approach of creating markets for environmental goods and services is critiqued and set aside to provide space for an organizational analysis. From an organizational perspective, the relationship between the state and agricultural agents is viewed as grounded in an over-arching exchange relationship including elements of cooperation and trust. Such a collaborative exchange relationship may prove useful in supporting exchange between agricultural agents and the state leading to the provision of ecological goods and services. Highlighting the potential of organizational economics, the analysis suggests that agri-environmental research and policy go further in accounting for, and investigating, the unique organizational modes of exchange governing the production of food, fiber, and ecological goods and services.

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  • Steele, Scott R., 2009. "Expanding the solution set: Organizational economics and agri-environmental policy," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 398-405, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:69:y:2009:i:2:p:398-405
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    Cited by:

    1. Zenglian Zhang & Wenju Zhao, 2018. "Research on Financial Pressure, Poverty Governance, and Environmental Pollution in China," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 10(6), pages 1-24, June.

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