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Precautionary principle as a rule of choice with optimism on windfall gains and pessimism on catastrophic losses

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  • Basili, Marcello
  • Chateauneuf, Alain
  • Fontini, Fulvio

Abstract

The paper investigates a decision-making process involving both risk and ambiguity. Differently from existing papers [Basili, M., Chateauneuf, A., Fontini, F., 2005. Choices under ambiguity with familiar and unfamiliar outcomes, Theory and Decision 58, 195-207; Chichilnisky, G., 2000. Axiomatic approach to choice under uncertainty with catastrophic risks. Resources and Energy Economics 22, 221-231; Chichilnisky, G., 2002. In: El-Shaarawi, A.,H., Piegorsch, W.W. (Eds.), Catastropic Risks. Encyclopedia of Environmetrics, vol. 1. John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, Chichester, UK, pp. 274-279], we assume that, in a Choquet Expected Utility framework, the decision-maker is pessimistic with respect to unfamiliar (catastrophic) losses, optimistic with respect to unfamiliar (windfall) gains and ambiguity-neutral with respect to the familiar world. A representation of the decision-maker's choice is obtained that mimics the Restricted Bayes-Hurwicz Criterion. In this way a characterization of the Precautionary Principle is introduced for decision-making processes under ambiguity with catastrophic losses and/or windfall gains.

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  • Basili, Marcello & Chateauneuf, Alain & Fontini, Fulvio, 2008. "Precautionary principle as a rule of choice with optimism on windfall gains and pessimism on catastrophic losses," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(3), pages 485-491, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:67:y:2008:i:3:p:485-491
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    Cited by:

    1. Helena Gaspars-Wieloch, 2017. "Newsvendor problem under complete uncertainty: a case of innovative products," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 25(3), pages 561-585, September.
    2. A. Maron & M. Maron, 2019. "Minimizing the Maximum Risk of Currency Conversion for a Company Buying Abroad," European Research Studies Journal, European Research Studies Journal, vol. 0(3), pages 59-67.
    3. Aldred, Jonathan, 2013. "Justifying precautionary policies: Incommensurability and uncertainty," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 132-140.
    4. Meglena Jeleva & Stéphane Rossignol, 2019. "Optimists, Pessimists, and the Precautionary Principle," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 74(1), pages 367-396, September.
    5. Fontini, Fulvio & Umgiesser, Georg & Vergano, Lucia, 2010. "The role of ambiguity in the evaluation of the net benefits of the MOSE system in the Venice lagoon," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(10), pages 1964-1972, August.
    6. BRECHET, Thierry & THENIE, Julien & ZEIMES, Thibaut & ZUBER, Stéphane, 2010. "The benefits of cooperation under uncertainty: the case of climate change," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2010062, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    7. Marcello Basili, 2008. "The global strategy to cope with H5N1: the property rights caveat," Department of Economic Policy, Finance and Development (DEPFID) University of Siena 0908, Department of Economic Policy, Finance and Development (DEPFID), University of Siena.
    8. Marcello Basili & Antonio Nicita, 2020. "The Covid-19/SARS CoV-2 pandemic outbreak and the risk of institutional failures," Department of Economics University of Siena 823, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
    9. Helena Gaspars-Wieloch, 2019. "Project Net Present Value estimation under uncertainty," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 27(1), pages 179-197, March.
    10. Helena Gaspars-Wieloch, 2018. "The Impact of the Structure of the Payoff Matrix on the Final Decision made Under Uncertainty," Asia-Pacific Journal of Operational Research (APJOR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 35(01), pages 1-27, February.
    11. Helena Gaspars-Wieloch, 2014. "Modifications of the Hurwicz’s decision rule," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 22(4), pages 779-794, December.
    12. Helena Gaspars-Wieloch, 2015. "On a decision rule supported by a forecasting stage based on the decision maker’s coefficient of optimism," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 23(3), pages 579-594, September.
    13. Heyen, Daniel & Goeschl, Timo & Wiesenfarth , Boris, 2015. "Risk Assessment under Ambiguity: Precautionary Learning vs. Research Pessimism," Working Papers 0605, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.

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