IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/ecolec/v135y2017icp186-194.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Culture, Conservation and Crime: Regulating Ivory Markets for Antiques and Crafts

Author

Listed:
  • Collins, Alan
  • Cox, Caroline
  • Pamment, Nick

Abstract

Elephant population numbers are seriously declining due to poaching activity to provide illegal ivory for crafted items, sculpture and jewellery. Despite seemingly robust legislation controlling legal ivory sales (including export permit requirements for UK sales abroad) and the that fact that synthetic ivory can now be created to the same diagnostic standards as genuine ivory, selling at a fraction of the cost, the demand for the ‘real thing’ continues to rise in craft and antique markets with very few prosecutions in the UK. Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that “ghost ivory” (post 1947 worked ivory being sold as pre-1947 worked ivory) is being sold by traders to the unsuspecting and uneducated buyer. Two key illegal sub-markets are identified and a socio-legal and economic analysis of the regulatory options available is presented.

Suggested Citation

  • Collins, Alan & Cox, Caroline & Pamment, Nick, 2017. "Culture, Conservation and Crime: Regulating Ivory Markets for Antiques and Crafts," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 186-194.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:135:y:2017:i:c:p:186-194
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2017.01.018
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0921800916308515
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2017.01.018?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Fischer, Carolyn, 2004. "The complex interactions of markets for endangered species products," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 926-953, September.
    2. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Charles F. Mason & Erwin H. Bulte & Richard D. Horan, 2012. "Banking on extinction: endangered species and speculation," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 28(1), pages 180-192, Spring.
    4. Bulte, Erwin H. & van Kooten, G. Cornelis, 1996. "A note on ivory trade and elephant conservation," Environment and Development Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 1(4), pages 433-443, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Pavleska, Marija & Kerr, William A., 2020. "Importer's risk, smuggling and the role of incentives in the management of animal diseases," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 175(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Robert Innes & George Frisvold, 2009. "The Economics of Endangered Species," Annual Review of Resource Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 1(1), pages 485-512, September.
    2. van Kooten, G. Cornelis, 2006. "Protecting the African Elephant: A Dynamic Bioeconomic Model of Ivory Trade," 2006 Annual meeting, July 23-26, Long Beach, CA 21206, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    3. Chen, Frederick & ’t Sas-Rolfes, Michael, 2021. "Theoretical analysis of a simple permit system for selling synthetic wildlife goods," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 180(C).
    4. Ferrier, Peyton Michael, 2009. "The Economics of Agricultural and Wildlife Smuggling," Economic Research Report 55951, United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.
    5. Khalil, Umair, 2017. "Do more guns lead to more crime? Understanding the role of illegal firearms," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 342-361.
    6. van Ours, Jan C. & Williams, Jenny & Ward, Shannon, 2015. "Bad Behavior: Delinquency, Arrest and Early School Leaving," CEPR Discussion Papers 10755, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Patrick Arni & Rafael Lalive & Jan C. Van Ours, 2013. "How Effective Are Unemployment Benefit Sanctions? Looking Beyond Unemployment Exit," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(7), pages 1153-1178, November.
    8. Dennis L. Gärtner, 2022. "Corporate Leniency in a Dynamic World: The Preemptive Push of an Uncertain Future," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(1), pages 119-146, March.
    9. Deborah A. Cobb-Clark & Chris Ryan & Ana Sartbayeva, 2009. "Taking Chances: The Effect of Growing Up on Welfare on the Risky Behaviour of Young People," CEPR Discussion Papers 604, Centre for Economic Policy Research, Research School of Economics, Australian National University.
    10. Antonio Acconcia & Marcello D'Amato & Riccardo Martina, 2003. "Corruption and Tax Evasion with Competitive Bribes," CSEF Working Papers 112, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    11. J. K. Pappalardo, 2022. "Economics of Consumer Protection: Contributions and Challenges in Estimating Consumer Injury and Evaluating Consumer Protection Policy," Journal of Consumer Policy, Springer, vol. 45(2), pages 201-238, June.
    12. M. Martin Boyer, 2007. "Resistance (to Fraud) Is Futile," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 74(2), pages 461-492, June.
    13. David Cayla, 2021. "Le « vivre-ensemble » face au projet néolibéral," Post-Print hal-02961194, HAL.
    14. Gary Bolton & Eugen Dimant & Ulrich Schmidt, 2018. "When a Nudge Backfires. Using Observation with Social and Economic Incentives to Promote Pro-Social Behavior," PPE Working Papers 0017, Philosophy, Politics and Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    15. Dwenger, Nadja & Kleven, Henrik & Rasul, Imran & Rincke, Johannes, 2014. "Extrinsic vs Intrinsic Motivations for Tax Compliance. Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment in Germany," VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100389, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    16. Daron Acemoglu & Matthew O. Jackson, 2017. "Social Norms and the Enforcement of Laws," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 15(2), pages 245-295.
    17. Hahn Robert, 2010. "Designing Smarter Regulation with Improved Benefit-Cost Analysis," Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 1-19, July.
    18. Kerri Brick & Martine Visser & Justine Burns, 2012. "Risk Aversion: Experimental Evidence from South African Fishing Communities," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 94(1), pages 133-152.
    19. Entorf, Horst & Spengler, Hannes, 2000. "Socioeconomic and demographic factors of crime in Germany: Evidence from panel data of the German states," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 75-106, March.
    20. Fábio Pereira Silva & Reinaldo Guerreiro & Eduardo Flores, 2019. "Voluntary versus enforced tax compliance: the slippery slope framework in the Brazilian context," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 66(2), pages 147-180, June.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:135:y:2017:i:c:p:186-194. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolecon .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.