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Perverse incentives in fishery management: The case of the defeso in the Brazilian Amazon

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  • Corrêa, Maria Angélica de Almeida
  • Kahn, James R.
  • Freitas, Carlos Edwar de Carvalho

Abstract

The policy of a closed season with compensation for fishers (called the defeso) was implemented in Amazonia in 2005, with the idea of protecting fishery stocks while maintaining the flow of income of fishers, most of whom are small scale and artisanal fishers. This paper examines the economic theory of this policy, and shows that such a policy could actually hurt fish stocks, even if rigorously enforced. It is then shown that in the absence of enforcement, the policy would definitely lead to an increase in the number of fishers and a decline in fish stocks. In short, the current policy is worse than no policy. This hypothesis is tested using data from the state of Amazonas (both statewide data and data from the county (municipio) of Coari) and we arrive at the following conclusions. First, the defeso is completely unenforced. Second, the number of fishers has increased dramatically. Finally, catch per unit effort (CPUE) has declined over the period from 2005 to 2010 and additional evidence (presented later in the paper) suggests that stocks have decreased as well. The paper concludes with the recommendation of spatially oriented fishery regulations (zoning and rotating closures) combined with a co-management regime with fishing communities.

Suggested Citation

  • Corrêa, Maria Angélica de Almeida & Kahn, James R. & Freitas, Carlos Edwar de Carvalho, 2014. "Perverse incentives in fishery management: The case of the defeso in the Brazilian Amazon," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 186-194.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:106:y:2014:i:c:p:186-194
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2014.07.023
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Thaissa Sobreiro & Carlos Carvalho Freitas & Karen Prado & Fabíola Nascimento & Rafaela Vicentini & Aprígio Moraes, 2010. "An evaluation of fishery co-management experience in an Amazonian black-water river (Unini River, Amazon, Brazil)," Environment, Development and Sustainability: A Multidisciplinary Approach to the Theory and Practice of Sustainable Development, Springer, vol. 12(6), pages 1013-1024, December.
    2. H. Scott Gordon, 1954. "The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Chennat Gopalakrishnan (ed.), Classic Papers in Natural Resource Economics, chapter 9, pages 178-203, Palgrave Macmillan.
    3. repec:bla:devpol:v:28:y:2010:i:3:p:325-358 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Abdallah, Patrízia R. & Sumaila, Ussif R., 2007. "An historical account of Brazilian public policy on fisheries subsidies," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 444-450, July.
    5. Anthony Scott, 1955. "The Fishery: The Objectives of Sole Ownership," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 63(2), pages 116-116.
    6. H. Scott Gordon, 1954. "The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 62(2), pages 124-124.
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    Cited by:

    1. Annabelle Jade Bladon & Essam Yassin Mohammed & Belayet Hossain & Golam Kibria & Liaquat Ali & E J Milner-Gulland, 2018. "Evaluating the ecological and social targeting of a compensation scheme in Bangladesh," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 13(6), pages 1-19, June.
    2. Adler Mandelbaum, Sara E, 2014. "Effects of Threshold Uncertainty on Common-Pool Resources," MPRA Paper 59120, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Victor Owusu & Kofi Adu-Boahen & Sender Kyeremeh & Innocent Demalie & Philip Eshun, 2023. "Factors influencing compliance of closed fishing season: lessons from small-scale coastal fisheries in the Central Region of Ghana," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 10(1), pages 1-8, December.

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