IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/wpaper/hal-01897091.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Analyse des modes de régulation publique des pêcheries : applicabilité d'un système de quotas individuels transférables à l'Union européenne

Author

Listed:
  • Catherine Benjamin

    (ESR - Unité de recherche d'Économie et Sociologie Rurales - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique)

  • Hervé Guyomard

    (ESR - Unité de recherche d'Économie et Sociologie Rurales - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique)

Abstract

Après avoir rappelé la nécessité de l'intervention publique pour la gestion des ressources halieutiques, ce rapport présente, tout d'abord, les modes alternatifs de régulation des pêcheries qui peuvent être classés en deux catégories : les politiques de contrôle des facteurs de production et les politiques de régulation directe de la production. L'analyse des conséquences théoriques de ces différents instruments montre, en particulier, qu'une politique fondée sur le seul contrôle du niveau des captures globales n'est pas suffisante pour résoudre les problèmes de surexploitation des ressources halieutiques. L'expérience de gestion publique de quelques grands pays pêcheurs est ensuite retracée. Il apparaît que le nombre de pêcheries réglementé par des droits de pêche individuels transférables est croissant, et conformément à l'analyse théorique, l'utilisation de cet instrument a permis le plus souvent de freiner la surexploitation et les effets négatifs induits (course au poisson,...). Le rapport détaille ensuite les raisons de l'échec de la politique commune de la pêche (PCP) de l'Union européenne, politique fondée sur un contrôle des captures globales complété par des mesures techniques. Cette analyse permet, en conclusion, de dégager les conditions d'un succès d'une nouvelle politique commune de la pêche basée sur la mise en place de quotas individuels transférables.

Suggested Citation

  • Catherine Benjamin & Hervé Guyomard, 1996. "Analyse des modes de régulation publique des pêcheries : applicabilité d'un système de quotas individuels transférables à l'Union européenne," Working Papers hal-01897091, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01897091
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01897091v1
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://hal.science/hal-01897091v1/document
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Karagiannakos, A, 1996. "Total Allowable Catch (TAC) and quota management system in the European Union," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 235-248, May.
    2. Dupont, Diane P., 1990. "Rent dissipation in restricted access fisheries," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 26-44, July.
    3. R. Quentin Grafton, 1996. "Experiences with Individual Transferable Quotas: An Overview," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 29(s1), pages 135-138, April.
    4. H. Scott Gordon, 1954. "The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 62(2), pages 124-124.
    5. Garrod, B. & Whitmarsh, D., 1990. "Overcapitalisation and structural adjustment in UK fisheries," Discussion Papers 43., Centre for the Economics and Management of Aquatic Resources.
    6. H. Scott Gordon, 1954. "The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Chennat Gopalakrishnan (ed.), Classic Papers in Natural Resource Economics, chapter 9, pages 178-203, Palgrave Macmillan.
    7. Anthony Scott, 1955. "The Fishery: The Objectives of Sole Ownership," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 63(2), pages 116-116.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Richard Schwindt & Aidan R. Vining & David Weimer, 2003. "A Policy Analysis of the BC Salmon Fishery," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 29(1), pages 73-93, March.
    2. Diane P. Dupont, 2010. "Fisheries economics: cutting a broad swath in the field of scientific inquiry," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 54(3), pages 259-263, July.
    3. McCloskey Deirdre Nansen, 2018. "The Two Movements in Economic Thought, 1700–2000: Empty Economic Boxes Revisited," Man and the Economy, De Gruyter, vol. 5(2), pages 1-20, December.
    4. Catherine J. Morrison Paul & Ronald G. Felthoven & Marcelo de O. Torres, 2010. "Productive performance in fisheries: modeling, measurement, and management," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 54(3), pages 343-360, July.
    5. Pies, Ingo, 2012. "Optimierung versus Koordinierung: Zur ordonomischen Klärung des wirtschaftsethischen Problems," Discussion Papers 2012-21, Martin Luther University of Halle-Wittenberg, Chair of Economic Ethics.
    6. Behringer, Stefan & Upmann, Thorsten, 2014. "Optimal harvesting of a spatial renewable resource," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 105-120.
    7. Geoffrey Fishburn & Murray C. Kemp, 2014. "The Gain from International Trade in Pool Goods and Private Goods," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(1), pages 167-169, February.
    8. Brander, James A. & Scott Taylor, M., 1998. "Open access renewable resources: Trade and trade policy in a two-country model," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 181-209, April.
    9. Bruno Drouot, 2012. "Les facteurs explicatifs de la dépendance économique des patrons pêcheurs à une ressource naturelle : le cas de la pêcherie de bar commun en France," Post-Print hal-01870830, HAL.
    10. Grafton, R. Quentin & Kompas, Tom & Chu, Long & Che, Nhu, 2010. "Maximum economic yield," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 54(3), pages 1-8.
    11. Gardner Brown, 2000. "Renewable Natural Resource Management and Use Without Markets," Working Papers 0025, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
    12. B. N. Obegi & I. Sarfo & G. N. Morara & P. Boera & E. Waithaka & A. Mutie, 2020. "Bio-economic modeling of fishing activities in Kenya: the case of Lake Naivasha Ramsar site," Journal of Bioeconomics, Springer, vol. 22(1), pages 15-31, April.
    13. Gissurarson Hannes H., 2000. "When Ideas Conspire with Circumstances: Introducing Individual Transferable Quotas in Fisheries," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 10(2-3), pages 285-314, June.
    14. López, Ramón & Schiff, Maurice, 2013. "Interactive dynamics between natural and man-made assets: The impact of external shocks," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 1-15.
    15. James A. Brander & M. Scott Taylor, 1997. "International Trade and Open-Access Renewable Resources: The Small Open Economy Case," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 30(3), pages 526-552, August.
    16. Gordon Munro & U. Sumaila, 2015. "On the Contributions of Colin Clark to Fisheries Economics," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 61(1), pages 1-17, May.
    17. Bellanger, Manuel & Fonner, Robert & Holland, Daniel S. & Libecap, Gary D. & Lipton, Douglas W. & Scemama, Pierre & Speir, Cameron & Thébaud, Olivier, 2021. "Cross-sectoral externalities related to natural resources and ecosystem services," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).
    18. Berck, Peter & Costello, Christopher, 2000. "Overharvesting the traditional fishery with a captured regulator," CUDARE Working Papers 43915, University of California, Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    19. Darcy W E Allen, 2020. "When Entrepreneurs Meet:The Collective Governance of New Ideas," World Scientific Books, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., number q0269, September.
    20. Manuel Pacheco Coelho, 2011. "“On Rents of Fishing Grounds” Revisited," International Journal of Finance, Insurance and Risk Management, International Journal of Finance, Insurance and Risk Management, vol. 1(2), pages 1-74.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01897091. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.