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Analyse des modes de régulation publique des pêcheries : applicabilité d'un système de quotas individuels transférables à l'Union européenne

Author

Listed:
  • Catherine Benjamin

    (ESR - Unité de recherche d'Économie et Sociologie Rurales - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique)

  • Hervé Guyomard

    (ESR - Unité de recherche d'Économie et Sociologie Rurales - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique)

Abstract

Après avoir rappelé la nécessité de l'intervention publique pour la gestion des ressources halieutiques, ce rapport présente, tout d'abord, les modes alternatifs de régulation des pêcheries qui peuvent être classés en deux catégories : les politiques de contrôle des facteurs de production et les politiques de régulation directe de la production. L'analyse des conséquences théoriques de ces différents instruments montre, en particulier, qu'une politique fondée sur le seul contrôle du niveau des captures globales n'est pas suffisante pour résoudre les problèmes de surexploitation des ressources halieutiques. L'expérience de gestion publique de quelques grands pays pêcheurs est ensuite retracée. Il apparaît que le nombre de pêcheries réglementé par des droits de pêche individuels transférables est croissant, et conformément à l'analyse théorique, l'utilisation de cet instrument a permis le plus souvent de freiner la surexploitation et les effets négatifs induits (course au poisson,...). Le rapport détaille ensuite les raisons de l'échec de la politique commune de la pêche (PCP) de l'Union européenne, politique fondée sur un contrôle des captures globales complété par des mesures techniques. Cette analyse permet, en conclusion, de dégager les conditions d'un succès d'une nouvelle politique commune de la pêche basée sur la mise en place de quotas individuels transférables.

Suggested Citation

  • Catherine Benjamin & Hervé Guyomard, 1996. "Analyse des modes de régulation publique des pêcheries : applicabilité d'un système de quotas individuels transférables à l'Union européenne," Working Papers hal-01897091, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01897091
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01897091v1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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