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Les facteurs explicatifs de la dépendance économique des patrons pêcheurs à une ressource naturelle : le cas de la pêcherie de bar commun en France

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  • Bruno Drouot

    (ESC Bretagne Brest - Ecole Supérieure de Commerce de Bretagne Brest - ESC Bretagne Brest)

Abstract

Troisième espèce débarquée en valeur en France (FranceAgriMer, 2012), le bar commun (dicentrarchus labrax) est une espèce capturée par de nombreux navires de pêche professionnelle. des travaux récents soulignent que des patrons pêcheurs dépendent économiquement de cette espèce (Daurès et al., 2009 ; Drouot, 2011). L'objectif de cet article est d'expliquer les facteurs qui influencent la probabilité qu'un navire de pêche soit dépendant du bar commun. La régression logistique permet d'étudier la relation entre la dépendance et les caractéristiques intrinsèques des navires, de leur activité et de leur origine spatio-temporelle. Les résultats issus du modèle permettent de caractériser les navires de pêche professionnelle et d'identifier les navires de pêche les plus exposés au risque de surexploitation du bar commun.

Suggested Citation

  • Bruno Drouot, 2012. "Les facteurs explicatifs de la dépendance économique des patrons pêcheurs à une ressource naturelle : le cas de la pêcherie de bar commun en France," Post-Print hal-01870830, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01870830
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01870830
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    References listed on IDEAS

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