IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/ecmode/v96y2021icp220-241.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Cost-effective mortgage modification program to reduce mortgage defaults

Author

Listed:
  • Kim, Jiseob
  • Lim, Taejun

Abstract

What is the most cost-effective mortgage modification program to reduce mortgage defaults? To shed light on this question and evaluate the Home Affordable Modication Program (HAMP) initiated in 2009, we present a quantitative model where home-buying households can take out a mortgage loan whose price is endogenously determined to reflect the mortgage contract terms—maturity, per-period payment, and amortization scheme—as well as the default risk. We conduct an experiment in which (i) a series of house price shocks are plugged into the model economy to generate the housing market crash, mirroring the recent financial crisis, and (ii) three alternative government-funded mortgage modification programs, each associated with a change in maturity, per-period payment, or amortization scheme, are introduced and compared. We find that the amortization reschedule is the most cost-effective way of implementing a modification program, followed by the payment reduction and the term extension.

Suggested Citation

  • Kim, Jiseob & Lim, Taejun, 2021. "Cost-effective mortgage modification program to reduce mortgage defaults," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 220-241.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:96:y:2021:i:c:p:220-241
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2020.12.030
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0264999320312955
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.econmod.2020.12.030?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kartik Athreya & Juan M. Sánchez & Xuan S. Tam & Eric R. Young, 2018. "Bankruptcy And Delinquency In A Model Of Unsecured Debt," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(2), pages 593-623, May.
    2. Sumit Agarwal & Gene Amromin & Itzhak Ben-David & Souphala Chomsisengphet & Tomasz Piskorski & Amit Seru, 2017. "Policy Intervention in Debt Renegotiation: Evidence from the Home Affordable Modification Program," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 125(3), pages 654-712.
    3. Christopher Foote & Kristopher Gerardi & Lorenz Goette & Paul Willen, 2010. "Reducing Foreclosures: No Easy Answers," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2009, Volume 24, pages 89-138, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Igor Livshits & James MacGee & Michèle Tertilt, 2010. "Accounting for the Rise in Consumer Bankruptcies," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(2), pages 165-193, April.
    5. Seon Tae Kim & Gabriel Mihalache & Yan Bai, 2014. "Maturity and Repayment Structure of Sovereign Debt," 2014 Meeting Papers 523, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    6. Kurt Mitman, 2016. "Macroeconomic Effects of Bankruptcy and Foreclosure Policies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(8), pages 2219-2255, August.
    7. Gerardi, Kristopher & Lambie-Hanson, Lauren & Willen, Paul S., 2013. "Do borrower rights improve borrower outcomes? Evidence from the foreclosure process," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 1-17.
    8. Jonathan Heathcote & Kjetil Storesletten & Giovanni L. Violante, 2017. "Optimal Tax Progressivity: An Analytical Framework," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 132(4), pages 1693-1754.
    9. Eric A. Posner & Luigi Zingales, 2009. "A Loan Modification Approach to the Housing Crisis," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 11(2), pages 575-607.
    10. Bulent Guler, 2015. "Innovations in Information Technology and the Mortgage Market," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 18(3), pages 456-483, July.
    11. David B. Gross, 2002. "An Empirical Analysis of Personal Bankruptcy and Delinquency," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 15(1), pages 319-347, March.
    12. Satyajit Chatterjee & Burcu Eyigungor, 2015. "A Quantitative Analysis of the US Housing and Mortgage Markets and the Foreclosure Crisis," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 18(2), pages 165-184, April.
    13. Storesletten, Kjetil & Telmer, Christopher I. & Yaron, Amir, 2004. "Consumption and risk sharing over the life cycle," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 609-633, April.
    14. Adelino, Manuel & Gerardi, Kristopher & Willen, Paul S., 2013. "Why don't Lenders renegotiate more home mortgages? Redefaults, self-cures and securitization," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(7), pages 835-853.
    15. Joseph W. Gruber & Robert F. Martin, 2003. "Precautionary savings and the wealth distribution with illiquid durables," International Finance Discussion Papers 773, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    16. John Y. Campbell & João F. Cocco, 2015. "A Model of Mortgage Default," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 70(4), pages 1495-1554, August.
    17. Morris A. Davis & Andreas Lehnert & Robert F. Martin, 2008. "The Rent‐Price Ratio For The Aggregate Stock Of Owner‐Occupied Housing," Review of Income and Wealth, International Association for Research in Income and Wealth, vol. 54(2), pages 279-284, June.
    18. Agarwal, Sumit & Amromin, Gene & Ben-David, Itzhak & Chomsisengphet, Souphala & Evanoff, Douglas D., 2011. "The role of securitization in mortgage renegotiation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(3), pages 559-578.
    19. Christopher Mayer & Edward Morrison & Tomasz Piskorski & Arpit Gupta, 2014. "Mortgage Modification and Strategic Behavior: Evidence from a Legal Settlement with Countrywide," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(9), pages 2830-2857, September.
    20. Greg Kaplan & Giovanni L. Violante, 2014. "A Model of the Consumption Response to Fiscal Stimulus Payments," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82(4), pages 1199-1239, July.
    21. Anthony Pennington-Cross, 2006. "The Value of Foreclosed Property," Journal of Real Estate Research, American Real Estate Society, vol. 28(2), pages 193-214.
    22. Piskorski, Tomasz & Seru, Amit & Vig, Vikrant, 2010. "Securitization and distressed loan renegotiation: Evidence from the subprime mortgage crisis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(3), pages 369-397, September.
    23. Davis, Andrew & Kim, Jiseob, 2017. "Explaining changes in the US credit card market: Lenders are using more information," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 76-92.
    24. Kim, Jiseob, 2017. "How Loan Modifications Influence The Prevalence Of Mortgage Defaults," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 21(1), pages 55-105, January.
    25. Yue, Vivian Z., 2010. "Sovereign default and debt renegotiation," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 176-187, March.
    26. Kristopher Gerardi & Wenli Li, 2010. "Mortgage foreclosure prevention efforts," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, vol. 95(2).
    27. Hatchondo, Juan Carlos & Martinez, Leonardo & Sosa Padilla, César, 2014. "Voluntary sovereign debt exchanges," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 32-50.
    28. Dean Corbae & Erwan Quintin, 2015. "Leverage and the Foreclosure Crisis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 123(1), pages 1-65.
    29. Joao Cocco & Nuno Clara, 2016. "An Analysis of Consumer Debt Restructuring Policies," 2016 Meeting Papers 480, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    30. Jeske, Karsten & Krueger, Dirk & Mitman, Kurt, 2013. "Housing, mortgage bailout guarantees and the macro economy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(8), pages 917-935.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Kim, Jiseob, 2019. "How foreclosure delays impact mortgage defaults and mortgage modifications," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 18-37.
    2. Kim, Jiseob & Wang, Yicheng, 2018. "Macroeconomic and distributional effects of mortgage guarantee programs for the poor," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 124-151.
    3. Kim, Jiseob, 2020. "Macroeconomic effects of the mortgage refinance and the home equity lines of credit," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 121(C).
    4. Kim, Jiseob, 2015. "Household’s optimal mortgage and unsecured loan default decision," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 222-244.
    5. Carlos Hatchondo, Juan & Martinez, Leonardo & Sánchez, Juan M., 2015. "Mortgage defaults," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 173-190.
      • Juan Carlos Hatchondo & Leonardo Martinez & Juan M. Sanchez, 2011. "Mortgage defaults," Working Papers 2011-019, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
      • Mr. Leonardo Martinez & Juan Carlos Hatchondo & Mr. Juan M. Sanchez, 2012. "Mortgage Defaults," IMF Working Papers 2012/026, International Monetary Fund.
      • Juan Carlos Hatchondo & Leonardo Martinez & Juan M. Sanchez, 2011. "Mortgage defaults," Working Paper 11-05, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
      • Juan Carlos Hatchondo & Leonardo Martinez & Juan M. Sanchez, 2015. "Mortgage Defaults," CAEPR Working Papers 2015-011, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Department of Economics, Indiana University Bloomington.
    6. Davis, Morris A. & Van Nieuwerburgh, Stijn, 2015. "Housing, Finance, and the Macroeconomy," Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, in: Gilles Duranton & J. V. Henderson & William C. Strange (ed.), Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, edition 1, volume 5, chapter 0, pages 753-811, Elsevier.
    7. Jiseob Kim, 2020. "How Unsecured Credit Policies Influence Mortgage and Unsecured Loan Defaults," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 52(5), pages 1271-1304, August.
    8. Hanming Fang & You Suk Kim & Wenli Li, 2016. "The dynamics of subprime adjustable-rate mortgage default: a structural estimation," Working Papers 16-2, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    9. Soyoung Lee, 2023. "The Macroeconomic Effects of Debt Relief Policies During Recessions," Staff Working Papers 23-48, Bank of Canada.
    10. Pedro Gete & Franco Zecchetto, 2018. "Distributional Implications of Government Guarantees in Mortgage Markets," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 31(3), pages 1064-1097.
    11. Hanming Fang & You Suk Kim & Wenli Li, 2015. "The Dynamics of Adjustable-Rate Subprime Mortgage Default: A Structural Estimation," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2015-114, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    12. Thomas Schelkle, 2018. "Mortgage Default during the U.S. Mortgage Crisis," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 50(6), pages 1101-1137, September.
    13. Kruger, Samuel, 2018. "The effect of mortgage securitization on foreclosure and modification," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 129(3), pages 586-607.
    14. Kleiner, Kristoph & Stoffman, Noah & Yonker, Scott E., 2021. "Friends with bankruptcy protection benefits," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 139(2), pages 578-605.
    15. Satyajit Chatterjee & Burcu Eyigungor, 2015. "A Quantitative Analysis of the US Housing and Mortgage Markets and the Foreclosure Crisis," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 18(2), pages 165-184, April.
    16. Agarwal, Sumit & Zhang, Yunqi, 2018. "Effects of government bailouts on mortgage modification," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 54-70.
    17. Sangyup Choi & Kimoon Jeong & Jiseob Kim, 2024. "Asymmetric Mortgage Channel of Monetary Policy: Refinancing as a Call Option," Working papers 2024rwp-228, Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute.
    18. Piskorski, Tomasz & Seru, Amit, 2021. "Debt relief and slow recovery: A decade after Lehman," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 141(3), pages 1036-1059.
    19. Alin Marius Andries & Anca Copaciu & Radu Popa & Razvan Vlahu, 2021. "Recourse and (strategic) mortgage defaults: Evidence from changes in housing market laws," Working Papers 727, DNB.
    20. James N. Conklin & Moussa Diop & Thao Le & Walter D’Lima, 2019. "The Importance of Originator-Servicer Affiliation in Loan Renegotiation," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 59(1), pages 56-89, July.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Mortgage modification; Foreclosure; HAMP;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E21 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Consumption; Saving; Wealth
    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • R21 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Household Analysis - - - Housing Demand
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:96:y:2021:i:c:p:220-241. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/30411 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.