Speculative and hedging interaction model in oil and U.S. dollar markets with financial transaction taxes

Our article develops a game theory model of interaction between speculative and hedging behaviors in the oil and US dollar markets, in the presence of a severe taxation on speculative financial transactions. From this microeconomic analysis, we derive a regulatory policy. This policy has two consequences at the macro level: on one hand, it has a certain stabilizing effects on oil and US dollar markets, limiting the number of speculative transactions and their size; on the other hand, it induces the speculators to find agreements with real economic agents, which are profitable for both parts. Moreover, we propose that the tax is mostly re-directed to support the real economy. So, the aim of this paper appears twofold: by using Game Theory, we suggest to a pair of economic agents a way to gain in a market, also in presence of a hard taxation on the financial transactions, proposing, at the same time, to normative authority, a method to limit the instability of oil and U.S. Dollar markets and to help real economy. Our idea, at the micro-economic level, is to exploit the hedging actions to obtain a profit, limiting, at the same time, at a macro-level, the speculative attacks on oil and U.S. Dollar markets. These goals are reached by the introduction of well designed financial transactions tax. In particular, we focus on a real economic subject (Multinational Air) and on an investment bank (Bank). The solutions collectively efficient are determined, at a micro-level, by certain agreements between the two economic subjects. Specifically, after an agreement which allows to obtain the maximum collective profit of the interaction, we propose and analyze four different possible fair divisions of this gain, by adopting the Kalai–Smorodinsky method.