IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/dyncon/v47y2014icp225-238.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Network structure, games, and agent dynamics

Author

Listed:
  • Wilhite, Allen

Abstract

Consider a group of agents embedded in a network, repeatedly playing a game with their neighbors. Each agent acts locally but through the links of the network local decisions percolate to the entire population. Past research shows that such a system converges either to an absorbing state (a fixed distribution of actions that once attained does not change) or to an absorbing set (a set of action distributions that may cycle in finite populations or behave chaotically in unbounded populations). In many network games, however, it is uncertain which situation emerges. In this paper I identify two fundamental network characteristics, boundary consistency and neighborhood overlap, that determine the outcome of all symmetric, binary-choice, network games. In quasi-consistent networks these games converge to an absorbing state regardless of the initial distribution of actions, and the degree to which neighborhoods overlap impacts the number and composition of those absorbing states.

Suggested Citation

  • Wilhite, Allen, 2014. "Network structure, games, and agent dynamics," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 225-238.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:47:y:2014:i:c:p:225-238
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2014.08.008
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165188914001973
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jedc.2014.08.008?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Apesteguia, Jose & Huck, Steffen & Oechssler, Jorg, 2007. "Imitation--theory and experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 217-235, September.
    2. Ellison, Glenn, 1993. "Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1047-1071, September.
    3. Fosco, Constanza & Mengel, Friederike, 2011. "Cooperation through imitation and exclusion in networks," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 35(5), pages 641-658, May.
    4. Vriend, Nicolaas J., 2006. "ACE Models of Endogenous Interactions," Handbook of Computational Economics, in: Leigh Tesfatsion & Kenneth L. Judd (ed.), Handbook of Computational Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 21, pages 1047-1079, Elsevier.
    5. Sanjeev Goyal, 2007. "Introduction to Connections: An Introduction to the Economics of Networks," Introductory Chapters, in: Connections: An Introduction to the Economics of Networks, Princeton University Press.
    6. Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January.
    7. Leigh Tesfatsion & Kenneth L. Judd (ed.), 2006. "Handbook of Computational Economics," Handbook of Computational Economics, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 2, number 2.
    8. Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew, 1993. "Rules of Thumb for Social Learning," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(4), pages 612-643, August.
    9. Michel BenaÔm & J–rgen W. Weibull, 2003. "Deterministic Approximation of Stochastic Evolution in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(3), pages 873-903, May.
    10. Wilhite, Allen, 2006. "Economic Activity on Fixed Networks," Handbook of Computational Economics, in: Leigh Tesfatsion & Kenneth L. Judd (ed.), Handbook of Computational Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 20, pages 1013-1045, Elsevier.
    11. Page, Scott E, 1997. "On Incentives and Updating in Agent Based Models," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 10(1), pages 67-87, February.
    12. Fernando Vega-Redondo, 1997. "The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(2), pages 375-384, March.
    13. Ilan Eshel & Larry Samuelson & Avner Shaked, "undated". "Altruists Egoists and Hooligans in a Local Interaction Model," ELSE working papers 005, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
    14. Eshel, Ilan & Samuelson, Larry & Shaked, Avner, 1998. "Altruists, Egoists, and Hooligans in a Local Interaction Model," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 157-179, March.
    15. Abhijit V. Banerjee, 1992. "A Simple Model of Herd Behavior," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 107(3), pages 797-817.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Jinhua Zhao & Xianjia Wang & Cuiling Gu & Ying Qin, 2021. "Structural Heterogeneity and Evolutionary Dynamics on Complex Networks," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 612-629, September.
    2. Mitja Steinbacher & Matthias Raddant & Fariba Karimi & Eva Camacho Cuena & Simone Alfarano & Giulia Iori & Thomas Lux, 2021. "Advances in the agent-based modeling of economic and social behavior," SN Business & Economics, Springer, vol. 1(7), pages 1-24, July.
    3. Annie TUBADJI & Vassilis ANGELIS & Peter NIJKAMP, 2019. "Micro-Cultural Preferences and Macro-Percolation of New Ideas: A NetLogo Simulation," Journal of the Knowledge Economy, Springer;Portland International Center for Management of Engineering and Technology (PICMET), vol. 10(1), pages 168-185, March.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Jackson, Matthew O. & Zenou, Yves, 2015. "Games on Networks," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    2. Tsakas, Nikolas, 2012. "Naive learning in social networks: Imitating the most successful neighbor," MPRA Paper 37796, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Tsakas, Nikolas, 2017. "Diffusion by imitation: The importance of targeting agents," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 118-151.
    4. Jonas Hedlund, 2015. "Imitation in Cournot oligopolies with multiple markets," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 60(3), pages 567-587, November.
    5. Dawid, Herbert, 2007. "Evolutionary game dynamics and the analysis of agent-based imitation models: The long run, the medium run and the importance of global analysis," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 31(6), pages 2108-2133, June.
    6. Friederike Mengel, 2009. "Conformism and cooperation in a local interaction model," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 397-415, June.
    7. Simon Weidenholzer, 2010. "Coordination Games and Local Interactions: A Survey of the Game Theoretic Literature," Games, MDPI, vol. 1(4), pages 1-35, November.
    8. Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Weidenholzer, Simon, 2014. "Imitation and the role of information in overcoming coordination failures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 397-411.
    9. Tsakas Nikolas, 2014. "Imitating the Most Successful Neighbor in Social Networks," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(4), pages 403-435, February.
    10. Hedlund Jonas, 2012. "Altruism and Local Interaction," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-27, June.
    11. Alexander Matros, 2006. "Altruistic Versus Rational Behavior in a Public Good Game," Working Paper 309, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, revised Sep 2008.
    12. Matros, Alexander, 2012. "Altruistic versus egoistic behavior in a Public Good game," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 642-656.
    13. Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Weidenholzer, Simon, 2014. "Imitation and the role of information in overcoming coordination failures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 397-411.
    14. Abhimanyu Khan, 2014. "Coordination under global random interaction and local imitation," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(4), pages 721-745, November.
    15. Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Weidenholzer, Simon, 2008. "Contagion and efficiency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 251-274, November.
    16. Hsiao-Chi Chen & Yunshyong Chow & Li-Chau Wu, 2013. "Imitation, local interaction, and coordination," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(4), pages 1041-1057, November.
    17. Ge Jiang & Simon Weidenholzer, 2017. "Local interactions under switching costs," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 64(3), pages 571-588, October.
    18. Aleksander Berentsen & Esther Bruegger & Simon Loertscher, "undated". "Heterogeneity, Local Information, and Global Interaction," IEW - Working Papers 182, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    19. Selten, Reinhard & Apesteguia, Jose, 2005. "Experimentally observed imitation and cooperation in price competition on the circle," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 171-192, April.
    20. Zhiwei Cui, 2019. "Matching, Imitation, and Coordination in Networks," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 47-67, March.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Games; Networks; Local interaction; Network structure; Agent dynamics;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:47:y:2014:i:c:p:225-238. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jedc .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.