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Averaged predictions and the learning of equilibrium play

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  • Flam, Sjur Didrik

Abstract

The main objects here are noncooperative games in which all externalities occur via a one-dimensional variable. So-called mean-value iterates are used to approach Nash equilibrium. The proposed schemes generalize many received methods, and can be interpreted as learning taking place during repeated play. An important feature is that no player need to be fully informed about the game structure. Particular examples include Cournot oligopolies and some nonatomic market games.
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  • Flam, Sjur Didrik, 1998. "Averaged predictions and the learning of equilibrium play," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 22(6), pages 833-848, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:22:y:1998:i:6:p:833-848
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Gjerstad, Steven, 1996. "The Rate of Convergence of Continuous Fictitious Play," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(1), pages 161-177, January.
    3. SCHMEIDLER, David, 1973. "Equilibrium points of nonatomic games," LIDAM Reprints CORE 146, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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    5. Rath, Kali P, 1992. "A Direct Proof of the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games with a Continuum of Players," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 2(3), pages 427-433, July.
    6. Thorlund-Petersen, Lars, 1990. "Iterative computation of cournot equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 61-75, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Flam, Sjur Didrik & Horvath, Charles, 1998. "Stochastic mean values, rational expectations, and price movements," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 61(3), pages 293-299, December.
    2. Sjur Didrik Flåm, 2002. "Convexity, Differential Equations, and Games," CESifo Working Paper Series 655, CESifo.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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