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Markov bargaining games

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  • Cripps, Martin W.

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  • Cripps, Martin W., 1998. "Markov bargaining games," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 341-355, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:22:y:1998:i:3:p:341-355
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. Perry Motty & Reny Philip J., 1993. "A Non-cooperative Bargaining Model with Strategically Timed Offers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 50-77, February.
    3. Anat R. Admati & Motty Perry, 1987. "Strategic Delay in Bargaining," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 54(3), pages 345-364.
    4. Muthoo, Abhinay, 1990. "Bargaining without commitment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 291-297, September.
    5. Shaked, Avner & Sutton, John, 1984. "Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1351-1364, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Coles, Melvyn G. & Muthoo, Abhinay, 2003. "Bargaining in a non-stationary environment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 109(1), pages 70-89, March.
    2. Coles, M & Muthoo, A, 2000. "Bargaining equilibrium in a non-stationary environment," Economics Discussion Papers 4889, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
    3. Sebastian Schweighofer-Kodritsch, 2015. "Time Preferences and Bargaining," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series /2015/568, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
    4. Thanassoulis, John, 2010. "Optimal stalling when bargaining," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 101-120, February.
    5. Ali, S. Nageeb M., 2006. "Waiting to settle: Multilateral bargaining with subjective biases," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 130(1), pages 109-137, September.
    6. Ortner, Juan, 2013. "Optimism, delay and (in)efficiency in a stochastic model of bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 352-366.

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