IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/fip/fedcwp/9812.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Expectations, credibility, and time-consistent monetary policy

Author

Listed:
  • Peter N. Ireland

Abstract

This paper addresses the problem of multiple equilibria in a model of time-consistent monetary policy. The author suggests that the problem originates in the assumption that agents have rational expectations and proposes several alternative restrictions on expectations that allow the monetary authority to build credibility for a disinflationary policy by demonstrating that it will stick to that policy even if it imposes short-run costs on the economy.

Suggested Citation

  • Peter N. Ireland, 1998. "Expectations, credibility, and time-consistent monetary policy," Working Papers (Old Series) 9812, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedcwp:9812
    DOI: 10.26509/frbc-wp-199812
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.26509/frbc-wp-199812
    File Function: Persistent link
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://www.clevelandfed.org/-/media/project/clevelandfedtenant/clevelandfedsite/publications/working-papers/1998/wp-9812-expectations-credibility-and-time-consistent-monetary-policy-pdf.pdf
    File Function: Full text
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.26509/frbc-wp-199812?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
    2. Barro, Robert J., 1986. "Reputation in a model of monetary policy with incomplete information," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 3-20, January.
    3. Marcet, Albert & Sargent, Thomas J., 1989. "Convergence of least squares learning mechanisms in self-referential linear stochastic models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 337-368, August.
    4. Taylor, John B, 1982. "Establishing Credibility: A Rational Expectations Viewpoint," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(2), pages 81-85, May.
    5. Stokey, Nancy L., 1991. "Credible public policy," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 627-656, October.
    6. TILLMANN, Georg, 1983. "Stability in a simple pure consumption loan model," LIDAM Reprints CORE 615, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    7. McCallum, Bennett T, 1995. "Two Fallacies Concerning Central-Bank Independence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 207-211, May.
    8. Backus, David & Driffill, John, 1985. "Inflation and Reputation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(3), pages 530-538, June.
    9. Tillmann, Georg, 1983. "Stability in a simple pure consumption loan model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 315-329, August.
    10. Blackburn, Keith & Christensen, Michael, 1989. "Monetary Policy and Policy Credibility: Theories and Evidence," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 27(1), pages 1-45, March.
    11. Grandmont, Jean-Michel & Laroque, Guy, 1986. "Stability of cycles and expectations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 138-151, October.
    12. Lucas, Robert E, Jr, 1980. "Equilibrium in a Pure Currency Economy," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 18(2), pages 203-220, April.
    13. Fuchs, Gerard & Laroque, Guy, 1976. "Dynamics of Temporary Equilibria and Expectations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 44(6), pages 1157-1178, November.
    14. Fuchs, Gerard, 1979. "Is error learning behaviour stabilizing?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 300-317, June.
    15. Ireland, Peter N., 1997. "Sustainable monetary policies," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 87-108, November.
    16. Chari, V V & Kehoe, Patrick J, 1990. "Sustainable Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(4), pages 783-802, August.
    17. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1986. "Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 83-96, June.
    18. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Dai, Meixing & Sidiropoulos, Moïse & Spyromitros, Eleftherios, 2008. "Monetary policy transparency and inflation persistence in a small open economy," MPRA Paper 13829, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Mar 2009.
    2. Bullard, James & Mitra, Kaushik, 2002. "Learning about monetary policy rules," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(6), pages 1105-1129, September.
    3. Bayoumi, Tamim & Sgherri, Silvia, 2004. "Deconstructing the Art of Central Banking," CEPR Discussion Papers 4675, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Dawid, Herbert & Deissenberg, Christophe, 2005. "On the efficiency-effects of private (dis-)trust in the government," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 57(4), pages 530-550, August.
    5. Siu, Henry E., 2008. "Time consistent monetary policy with endogenous price rigidity," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 138(1), pages 184-210, January.
    6. Peter N. Ireland, 2002. ""Rules Rather Than Discretion" After Twenty Five Years: What Have We Learned? What More Can We Learn?," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 530, Boston College Department of Economics.
    7. Logan Rangasamy, 2011. "Food Inflation In South Africa: Some Implications For Economic Policy," South African Journal of Economics, Economic Society of South Africa, vol. 79(2), pages 184-201, June.
    8. Rangan Gupta & Charl Jooste, 2018. "Unconventional monetary policy shocks in OECD countries: how important is the extent of policy uncertainty?," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 683-703, July.
    9. Treu, Johannes & Hartwig, Johannes, 2023. "Perceived Inflation in Germany in 2022," MPRA Paper 118403, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Erceg, Christopher J. & Levin, Andrew T., 2003. "Imperfect credibility and inflation persistence," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 915-944, May.
    11. Sleet, Christopher & Yeltekin, Sevin, 2007. "Recursive monetary policy games with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 1557-1583, May.
    12. Willi Semmler, 2011. "Asset Prices, Booms and Recessions," Springer Books, Springer, number 978-3-642-20680-1, December.
    13. Bullard, James & Waller, Christopher J, 2004. "Central Bank Design in General Equilibrium," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 36(1), pages 95-113, February.
    14. Silvia Sgherri & Tamim Bayoumi, 2004. "Monetary Magic? How the Fed Improved the Supply Side of the Economy," Econometric Society 2004 Australasian Meetings 20, Econometric Society.
    15. Friedrich Fritzer & Fabio Rumler, 2015. "Determinants of Inflation Perceptions and Expectations: an Empirical Analysis for Austria," Monetary Policy & the Economy, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank), issue 1, pages 11-26.
    16. Gil-Alana, Luis A., 2011. "Inflation in South Africa. A long memory approach," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 111(3), pages 207-209, June.
    17. Florin O. Bilbiie, 2011. "The Time Inconsistency of Delegation-Based Time Inconsistency Solutions in Monetary Policy," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 150(3), pages 657-674, September.
    18. David Meenagh & Patrick Minford & Eric Nowell & Prakriti Sofat & Naveen Srinivasan, 2007. "Are the facts of UK inflation persistence to be explained by nominal rigidity or changes in monetary regime?," WEF Working Papers 0028, ESRC World Economy and Finance Research Programme, Birkbeck, University of London.
    19. Meenagh, David & Minford, Patrick & Nowell, Eric & Sofat, Prakriti & Srinivasan, Naveen, 2009. "Can the facts of UK inflation persistence be explained by nominal rigidity?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 26(5), pages 978-992, September.
    20. Logan Rangasamy, 2009. "Inflation Persistence And Core Inflation: The Case Of South Africa," South African Journal of Economics, Economic Society of South Africa, vol. 77(3), pages 430-444, September.
    21. Mitra, Kaushik, 2003. "Desirability of Nominal GDP Targeting under Adaptive Learning," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 35(2), pages 197-220, April.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ireland, Peter N., 1997. "Sustainable monetary policies," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 87-108, November.
    2. Richard Dennis & Tatiana Kirsanova, 2010. "Expectations traps and coordination failures: selecting among multiple discretionary equilibria," Working Paper Series 2010-02, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
    3. Susan Athey & Andrew Atkeson & Patrick J. Kehoe, 2005. "The Optimal Degree of Discretion in Monetary Policy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(5), pages 1431-1475, September.
    4. Schaumburg, Ernst & Tambalotti, Andrea, 2007. "An investigation of the gains from commitment in monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 302-324, March.
    5. Huh, Chan G. & Lansing, Kevin J., 2000. "Expectations, credibility, and disinflation in a small macroeconomic model," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 52(1-2), pages 51-86.
    6. Basso, Henrique S., 2009. "Delegation, time inconsistency and sustainable equilibrium," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 33(8), pages 1617-1629, August.
    7. Loisel, Olivier, 2008. "Central bank reputation in a forward-looking model," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 32(11), pages 3718-3742, November.
    8. Haizhou Huang & A. Jorge Padilla, 2002. "Fiscal Policy and the Implementation of the Walsh Contract for Central Bankers," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 3(1), pages 27-42, May.
    9. Elmar Mertens, 2016. "Managing Beliefs about Monetary Policy under Discretion," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 48(4), pages 661-698, June.
    10. Chari, V. V. & Christiano, Lawrence J. & Eichenbaum, Martin, 1998. "Expectation Traps and Discretion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 462-492, August.
    11. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1999. "Political economics and macroeconomic policy," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & M. Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 22, pages 1397-1482, Elsevier.
    12. Shurojit Chatterji & Ignacio N. Lobato, 2010. "Transformations of the state variable and learning dynamics," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 6(4), pages 385-403, December.
    13. Sleet, Christopher & Yeltekin, Sevin, 2007. "Recursive monetary policy games with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 1557-1583, May.
    14. Grandmont Jean-michel & Laroque Guy, 1987. "Stability, expectations, and predetermined variables," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 8714, CEPREMAP.
    15. Rotondi, Zeno, 2000. "Credibility of optimal monetary delegation: do we really need prohibitive reappointment costs?," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 0003, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
    16. Jim Granato, 1996. "The Effect of Policy-Maker Reputation and Credibility on Public Expectations," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 8(4), pages 449-470, October.
    17. Chan Guk Huh & Kevin J. Lansing, 1998. "Federal Reserve credibility and inflation scares," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, pages 3-16.
    18. Bodenstein, Martin & Hebden, James & Nunes, Ricardo, 2012. "Imperfect credibility and the zero lower bound," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 135-149.
    19. Francesco Salsano, 2005. "Monetary Policy in the Presence Of Imperfect Observability Of The Objectives Of Central Bankers," Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance 0523, Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics.
    20. Dennis W. Jansen & Liqun Liu & Ming‐Jang Weng, 2007. "Sustainability Of The Friedman Rule In An International Monetary Policy Game," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 45(3), pages 470-486, July.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Monetary policy; Rational expectations (Economic theory);

    JEL classification:

    • E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:fedcwp:9812. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: 4D Library (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/frbclus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.