IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/deveco/v171y2024ics0304387824000646.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Punishing mayors who fail the test: How do voters respond to information about educational outcomes?

Author

Listed:
  • Cox, Loreto
  • Eyzaguirre, Sylvia
  • Gallego, Francisco A.
  • García, Maximiliano

Abstract

This paper explores the electoral effects of providing information on the educational outcomes of municipal schools when the mayor is running for reelection. We designed and implemented an experiment in Chile whereby we sent 128,033 letters to voters in 400 randomly selected polling stations prior to the 2016 municipal elections. The letters included information on past test scores for local public schools (levels and changes), and either average or maximum outcomes for comparable municipalities. Our findings do not reveal a relevant average impact of the letters, but when they contain poor educational outcomes, voter turnout decreases, translating almost one to one in decreases in votes for the incumbent mayor. Voters respond to educational results in levels and to letters that have average results as a benchmark. The results are especially strong when poor educational outcomes come as bad news to voters. We also find spillover effects in the municipal council election. Overall, our findings suggest that voters hold politicians accountable when faced to certain (but not all) types of information on their performance. JEL Codes: D72, H75, I25.

Suggested Citation

  • Cox, Loreto & Eyzaguirre, Sylvia & Gallego, Francisco A. & García, Maximiliano, 2024. "Punishing mayors who fail the test: How do voters respond to information about educational outcomes?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 171(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:deveco:v:171:y:2024:i:c:s0304387824000646
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103315
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304387824000646
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103315?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gallego, Francisco A. & Malamud, Ofer & Pop-Eleches, Cristian, 2020. "Parental monitoring and children's internet use: The role of information, control, and cues," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
    2. Horacio Larreguy & John Marshall & James M SnyderJr., 2020. "Publicising Malfeasance: When the Local Media Structure Facilitates Electoral Accountability in Mexico," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 130(631), pages 2291-2327.
    3. Dunning, Thad & Grossman, Guy & Humphreys, Macartan & Hyde, Susan D. & McIntosh, Craig & Nellis, Gareth & Adida, Claire L. & Arias, Eric & Bicalho, Clara & Boas, Taylor C. & Buntaine, Mark T. & Chauch, 2019. "Voter information campaigns and political accountability: Cumulative findings from a preregistered meta-analysis of coordinated trials," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 5(7), pages 1-10.
    4. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, 2013. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Leonard C MacLean & William T Ziemba (ed.), HANDBOOK OF THE FUNDAMENTALS OF FINANCIAL DECISION MAKING Part I, chapter 6, pages 99-127, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    5. Gallego Francisco, 2013. "When Does Inter-School Competition Matter? Evidence from the Chilean “Voucher” System," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 13(2), pages 525-562, August.
    6. Claudio Ferraz & Frederico Finan, 2008. "Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil's Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 123(2), pages 703-745.
    7. Cesi Cruz & Philip Keefer & Julien Labonne, 2021. "Buying Informed Voters: New Effects of Information on Voters and Candidates," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 131(635), pages 1105-1134.
    8. Nicolás Ajzenman & Ruben Durante, 2023. "Salience and Accountability: School Infrastructure and Last-Minute Electoral Punishment," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 133(649), pages 460-476.
    9. Eric Arias & Horacio Larreguy & John Marshall & Pablo Querubin, 2022. "Priors Rule: When do Malfeasance Revelations Help and Hurt Incumbent Parties," Post-Print hal-03796026, HAL.
    10. Sergio Firpo & Renan Pieri & André Portela Souza, 2017. "Electoral impacts of uncovering public school quality: Evidence from Brazilian municipalities," Economia, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pós-Graduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics], vol. 17(1), pages 1-17.
    11. Ansolabehere, Stephen & Hirano, Shigeo & Snyder, James M. & Ueda, Michiko, 2006. "Party and Incumbency Cues in Voting: Are They Substitutes?," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 1(2), pages 119-137, March.
    12. de Figueiredo, Miguel F.P. & Hidalgo, F. Daniel & Kasahara, Yuri, 2023. "When Do Voters Punish Corrupt Politicians? Experimental Evidence from a Field and Survey Experiment," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 53(2), pages 728-739, April.
    13. Eric Arias & Horacio Larreguy & John Marshall & Pablo Querubín, 2022. "Priors Rule: When Do Malfeasance Revelations Help Or Hurt Incumbent Parties?," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 20(4), pages 1433-1477.
    14. Jessica Gottlieb, 2016. "Greater Expectations: A Field Experiment to Improve Accountability in Mali," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 60(1), pages 143-157, January.
    15. Tahir Andrabi & Natalie Bau & Jishnu Das & Naureen Karachiwalla & Asim Ijaz Khwaja, 2023. "Crowding in Private Quality: The Equilibrium Effects of Public Spending in Education," NBER Working Papers 30929, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Wayne Aaron Sandholtz & Wayne Sandholtz, 2024. "Secondary School Access Raises Primary School Achievement," CESifo Working Paper Series 11343, CESifo.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Loreto Cox & Sylvia Eyzaguirre & Francisco Gallego & Maximiliano García, 2020. "Punishing Mayors Who Fail the Test: How do Voters Respond to Information on Educational Outcomes?," Documentos de Trabajo 555, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
    2. Monica Martinez-Bravo & Carlos Sanz, 2022. "The Management of the Pandemic and its Effects on Trust and Accountability," Working Papers wp2022_2207, CEMFI.
    3. Monica Martinez‐Bravo & Carlos Sanz, 2025. "Trust and accountability in times of crisis," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 92(365), pages 230-258, January.
    4. Miriam Venturini, 2023. "The Imperfect Union: Labor Racketeering, Corruption Exposure, and Its Consequences," Working Papers 202407, University of California at Riverside, Department of Economics.
    5. Cañete-Straub, Rumilda & Miquel-Florensa, Josepa & Straub, Stéphane & Van der Straeten, Karine, 2020. "Voting corrupt politicians out of office? Evidence from a survey experiment in Paraguay," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 223-239.
    6. Cesi Cruz & Philip Keefer & Julien Labonne & Francesco Trebbi, 2024. "Making Policies Matter: Voter Responses to Campaign Promises," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 134(661), pages 1875-1913.
    7. Schechter, Laura & Vasudevan, Srinivasan, 2023. "Persuading voters to punish corrupt vote-buying candidates: Experimental evidence from a large-scale radio campaign in India," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 160(C).
    8. De La O, Ana L. & Fernández-Vázquez, Pablo & Martel García, Fernando, 2023. "Federal and state audits do not increase compliance with a grant program to improve municipal infrastructure: A pre-registered field experiment," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 162(C).
    9. Grácio, Matilde & Vicente, Pedro C., 2021. "Information, get-out-the-vote messages, and peer influence: Causal effects on political behavior in Mozambique," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 151(C).
    10. J. Andrew Harris & Catherine Kamindo & Peter van der Windt, 2020. "Electoral Administration in Fledgling Democracies:Experimental Evidence from Kenya," Working Papers 20200036, New York University Abu Dhabi, Department of Social Science, revised Jan 2020.
    11. Ivar Kolstad & Arne Wiig, 2016. "How do voters respond to information on self-serving elite behaviour? Evidence from a randomized survey experiment in Tanzania," CMI Working Papers 9, CMI (Chr. Michelsen Institute), Bergen, Norway.
    12. Mathias Bühler & Andrew Dickens & Andrew C. Dickens, 2024. "From Couch to Poll: Media Content and the Value of Local Information," CESifo Working Paper Series 10959, CESifo.
    13. Sarah Brierley, 2020. "Unprincipled Principals: Co‐opted Bureaucrats and Corruption in Ghana," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 64(2), pages 209-222, April.
    14. Hout, Wil & Wagner, Natascha & Demena, Binyam A., 2022. "Does accountability enhance service delivery? Assessment of a local scorecard initiative in Uganda," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 158(C).
    15. David Kreitmeir & Nathan Lane & Paul A. Raschky, 2020. "The Value of Names - Civil Society, Information, and Governing Multinationals on the Global Periphery," SoDa Laboratories Working Paper Series 2020-10, Monash University, SoDa Laboratories.
    16. Leon-Ciliotta, Gianmarco & Zejcirovic, Dijana & Fernández Bazán, Fernando, 2022. "Policy-Making, Trust and the Demand for Public Services: Evidence from a Mass Sterilizations Campaign," CEPR Discussion Papers 17361, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    17. Bowles, Jeremy & Larreguy, Horacio, 2020. "Who Debates, Who Wins? At-Scale Experimental Evidence on the Supply of Policy Information in a Liberian Election," TSE Working Papers 20-1153, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    18. Afridi, Farzana & Basistha, Ahana & Dhillon, Amrita & Serra, Danila, 2023. "Activating Change: The Role of Information and Beliefs in Social Activism," IZA Discussion Papers 16358, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    19. Kosec, Katrina & Wantchekon, Leonard, 2020. "Can information improve rural governance and service delivery?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 125(C).
    20. Tristan Canare & Ronald U. Mendoza, 2022. "Access to Information and Other Correlates of Vote Buying and Selling Behaviour: Insights from Philippine Data," Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics, , vol. 34(2), pages 139-161, July.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H75 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Government: Health, Education, and Welfare
    • I25 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Education and Economic Development

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:deveco:v:171:y:2024:i:c:s0304387824000646. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/devec .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.