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Making Policies Matter: Voter Responses to Campaign Promises

Author

Listed:
  • Cesi Cruz
  • Philip Keefer
  • Julien Labonne
  • Francesco Trebbi

Abstract

Can voters in clientelist countries be swayed by programmatic promises? Results from a structural model and a field experiment disseminating candidate policy platforms in Philippine mayoral elections indicate that they can. Voters who received information about candidate policy promises were more likely to vote for candidates who were closer to their own preferences. Voters who were informed about incumbent candidates’ past commitments were more likely to vote for incumbents who fulfilled them. The structural model uncovers mechanisms. Information about campaign promises increases policies’ salience relative to other voter concerns; it also affects voter beliefs about candidate quality and candidates’ platforms.

Suggested Citation

  • Cesi Cruz & Philip Keefer & Julien Labonne & Francesco Trebbi, 2024. "Making Policies Matter: Voter Responses to Campaign Promises," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 134(661), pages 1875-1913.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:econjl:v:134:y:2024:i:661:p:1875-1913.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ingar Haaland & Christopher Roth & Johannes Wohlfart, 2023. "Designing Information Provision Experiments," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 61(1), pages 3-40, March.
    2. Casas, Agustin, 2020. "The electoral benefits of unemployment, clientelism and distributive politics," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 129(C).
    3. Caroline Le Pennec & Vincent Pons, 2023. "How do Campaigns Shape Vote Choice? Multicountry Evidence from 62 Elections and 56 TV Debates," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 138(2), pages 703-767.
    4. Michael Callen & Jonathan L. Weigel & Noam Yuchtman, 2024. "Experiments About Institutions," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 16(1), pages 105-131, August.
    5. Wayne Aaron Sandholtz, 2022. "The politics of policy reform: experimental evidence from Liberia," NOVAFRICA Working Paper Series wp2202, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Nova School of Business and Economics, NOVAFRICA.
    6. Khanna, Gaurav & Mukherjee, Priya, 2023. "Political accountability for populist policies: Lessons from the world’s largest democracy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 219(C).
    7. Firoz Ahmed & Roland Hodler & Asad Islam, 2024. "Partisan Effects of Information Campaigns in Competitive Authoritarian Elections: Evidence from Bangladesh," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 134(660), pages 1303-1330.
    8. Mahambare, Vidya & Dhanaraj, Sowmya & Mittal, Pragati, 2022. "The political budget cycles in the presence of a fiscal rule: The case of farm debt waivers in India," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 44(3), pages 701-721.
    9. Dreher, Axel & Fuchs, Andreas & Hodler, Roland & Parks, Bradley C. & Raschky, Paul A. & Tierney, Michael J., 2019. "African leaders and the geography of China's foreign assistance," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 44-71.
    10. Caroline Le Pennec, 2024. "Strategic Campaign Communication: Evidence from 30,000 Candidate Manifestos," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 134(658), pages 785-810.
    11. Wayne Aaron Sandholtz & Wayne Sandholtz, 2023. "The Politics of Public Service Reform: Experimental Evidence from Liberia," CESifo Working Paper Series 10633, CESifo.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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