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Electoral impacts of uncovering public school quality: Evidence from Brazilian municipalities

Author

Listed:
  • Sergio Firpo

    (Insper)

  • Renan Pieri

    (Insper)

  • André Portela Souza

    (EESP-FGV, Brazil)

Abstract

Sistemas de school accountability que estabelecem a adoc¸ão de incentivos para professores e gestores geralmente impactam positivamente o desempenho dos alunos. No entanto, em muitas circunstâncias, sistemas de school accountability podem enfrentar restric¸ões institucionais para estabelecer recompensas e sanc¸ões para os administradores. Nesse aspecto, o sistema brasileiro de school accountability é um exemplo interessante: a maioria das escolas públicas com primário são administradas por funcionários municipais e o governo federal não pode impor a adopc¸ão de incentivos ao nível local. Entretanto, devido ao fato de os prefeitos dos municípios brasileiros serem os principais responsáveis pela educac¸ão primária pública, evidencia-se nas eleic¸ões locais de 2008, apenas alguns meses após a publicac¸ão da segunda onda de uma nova avaliac¸ão das escolas públicas pelo governo federal, prefeitos tornaram-se eleitoralmente responsáveis por não melhorar a qualidade da escola. Os resultados mostram que, em média, um aumento de um ponto em um índice de escala 0-10 entre 2005 e 2007 aumentou cerca de 5 pontos percentuais a probabilidade de reeleic¸ão dos prefeitos. Este efeito é ainda maior em localidades com menor renda per capita e aquelas em que a frac¸ão de crianc¸as em idade escolar é maior. Portanto, a responsabilizac¸ão eleitoral pode desempenhar um papel complementar em sistemas de school accountability, algo que ainda não foi totalmente exploradi pelas literaturas de educac¸ão, economia política e ciência política

Suggested Citation

  • Sergio Firpo & Renan Pieri & André Portela Souza, 2017. "Electoral impacts of uncovering public school quality: Evidence from Brazilian municipalities," Economia, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pós-Graduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics], vol. 17(1), pages 1-17.
    • Handle: RePEc:anp:econom:v:18:y:2017:1:1_17
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    1. Akhmed Akhmedov & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2004. "Opportunistic Political Cycles: Test in a Young Democracy Setting," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 119(4), pages 1301-1338.
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    3. Marcos Chamon & João Manoel Pinho de Mello & Sergio Firpo, 2008. "Electoral rules, political competition and fiscal spending : regression discontinuity evidence from Brazilian municipalities," Textos para discussão 559, Department of Economics PUC-Rio (Brazil).
    4. Drazen, Allan & Eslava, Marcela, 2010. "Electoral manipulation via voter-friendly spending: Theory and evidence," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(1), pages 39-52, May.
    5. Ferraz, Claudio & Finan, Frederico & Moreira, Diana B., 2012. "Corrupting learning," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(9-10), pages 712-726.
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    Cited by:

    1. Camargo, Braz & Camelo, Rafael & Firpo, Sergio & Ponczek, Vladimir, 2014. "Information, Market Incentives, and Student Performance," IZA Discussion Papers 7941, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    2. Tavares, José & Mesquita Gabriel, José & Pereira Dos Santos, Joao, 2020. "Leave them Kids Alone! National Exams as a Political Tool," CEPR Discussion Papers 14374, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. João Pereira dos Santos & José Tavares & José Mesquita, 2021. "Leave them kids alone! National exams as a political tool," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 189(3), pages 405-426, December.
    4. Loreto Cox & Sylvia Eyzaguirre & Francisco Gallego & Maximiliano García, 2020. "Punishing Mayors Who Fail the Test: How do Voters Respond to Information on Educational Outcomes?," Documentos de Trabajo 555, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
    5. Cox, Loreto & Eyzaguirre, Sylvia & Gallego, Francisco A. & García, Maximiliano, 2024. "Punishing mayors who fail the test: How do voters respond to information about educational outcomes?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 171(C).
    6. Kalinca Léia Becker, 2023. "An analysis of Fundeb's contribution to the quality of public education in Brazilian municipalities," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(2), pages 879-896, May.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Educac¸ão pública; Sistemas de responsabilizac¸ão escolar e eleitoral; Eleic¸ões para reeleic¸ão de prefeitos;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education
    • I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy

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