Electoral impacts of uncovering public school quality: Evidence from Brazilian municipalities
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- Firpo, Sergio & Pieri, Renan & Portela Souza, André, 2012. "Electoral Impacts of Uncovering Public School Quality: Evidence from Brazilian Municipalities," IZA Discussion Papers 6524, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Camargo, Braz & Camelo, Rafael & Firpo, Sergio & Ponczek, Vladimir, 2014. "Information, Market Incentives, and Student Performance," IZA Discussion Papers 7941, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Cox, Loreto & Eyzaguirre, Sylvia & Gallego, Francisco A. & García, Maximiliano, 2024. "Punishing mayors who fail the test: How do voters respond to information about educational outcomes?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 171(C).
- Tavares, José & Mesquita Gabriel, José & Pereira Dos Santos, Joao, 2020. "Leave them Kids Alone! National Exams as a Political Tool," CEPR Discussion Papers 14374, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Loreto Cox & Sylvia Eyzaguirre & Francisco Gallego & Maximiliano García, 2020. "Punishing Mayors Who Fail the Test: How do Voters Respond to Information on Educational Outcomes?," Documentos de Trabajo 555, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
- João Pereira dos Santos & José Tavares & José Mesquita, 2021. "Leave them kids alone! National exams as a political tool," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 189(3), pages 405-426, December.
- Kalinca Léia Becker, 2023. "An analysis of Fundeb's contribution to the quality of public education in Brazilian municipalities," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(2), pages 879-896, May.
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More about this item
Keywords
Educac¸ão pública; Sistemas de responsabilizac¸ão escolar e eleitoral; Eleic¸ões para reeleic¸ão de prefeitos;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education
- I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy
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