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Behavioral spillover between firms with shared auditors: The monitoring role of capital market investors

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  • Cao, Viet Nga
  • Pham, Anh Viet

Abstract

This paper examines the monitoring role of investors in the behavioral spillover between firms with shared auditors. Our context involves firms receiving U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission comment letters on issues relating to the recognition of revenue, gains, or losses (RRGL) in their 10-K filings and subsequently engaging in a higher degree of accounting conservatism. Investors of firms who did not receive a comment letter but share auditors with RRGL comment letter recipients react adversely to the release of these comment letters. Through the threat of downward stock price pressure on the value of Chief Financial Officers' equity compensation, investors induce the nonrecipients to also engage in a higher degree of accounting conservatism. When exposed to higher reputation and litigation risks, the shared auditors further contribute to the behavioral spillover between their clients by acting as informational intermediaries.

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  • Cao, Viet Nga & Pham, Anh Viet, 2021. "Behavioral spillover between firms with shared auditors: The monitoring role of capital market investors," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:corfin:v:68:y:2021:i:c:s0929119921000353
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2021.101914
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Investors; Auditors; Spillover; SEC comment letters; Accounting conservatism;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting
    • M42 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Auditing

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