IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/corfin/v45y2017icp586-607.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The governance transfer of blockholders: Evidence from block acquisitions and earnings management around the world

Author

Listed:
  • Dai, Lili
  • Dharwadkar, Ravi
  • Shi, Linna
  • Zhang, Bohui

Abstract

We examine the governance transfer effect of corporate blockholders in a sample of 892 block acquisitions across 42 countries from 1990 to 2008. Using earnings management as a proxy for corporate governance outcome, we find that target firms' earnings management is aligned with that of block acquirers after acquisitions, implying that blockholders transfer their own governance quality to investee firms. We further identify three economic mechanisms that underlie the governance transfer effect, namely, monitoring effectiveness, monitoring cost, and monitoring environment. Our findings provide new insights into the governance role of blockholders.

Suggested Citation

  • Dai, Lili & Dharwadkar, Ravi & Shi, Linna & Zhang, Bohui, 2017. "The governance transfer of blockholders: Evidence from block acquisitions and earnings management around the world," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 586-607.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:corfin:v:45:y:2017:i:c:p:586-607
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.06.004
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0929119916301596
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.06.004?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Daouk, Hazem & Lee, Charles M.C. & Ng, David, 2006. "Capital market governance: How do security laws affect market performance?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 560-593, June.
    2. La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert, 1999. "The Quality of Government," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(1), pages 222-279, April.
    3. Francis, Jennifer & LaFond, Ryan & Olsson, Per & Schipper, Katherine, 2005. "The market pricing of accruals quality," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 295-327, June.
    4. Stijn Claessens & Simeon Djankov & Joseph P. H. Fan & Larry H. P. Lang, 2002. "Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(6), pages 2741-2771, December.
    5. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez‐De‐Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2006. "What Works in Securities Laws?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(1), pages 1-32, February.
    6. Dow, James & Gorton, Gary, 1997. "Stock Market Efficiency and Economic Efficiency: Is There a Connection?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(3), pages 1087-1129, July.
    7. Jong†Hag Choi & Jeong†Bon Kim & Xiaohong Liu & Dan A. Simunic, 2008. "Audit Pricing, Legal Liability Regimes, and Big 4 Premiums: Theory and Cross†country Evidence," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 25(1), pages 55-99, March.
    8. Masulis, Ronald W. & Wang, Cong & Xie, Fei, 2012. "Globalizing the boardroom—The effects of foreign directors on corporate governance and firm performance," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 527-554.
    9. Clifford G. Holderness, 2003. "A survey of blockholders and corporate control," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 9(Apr), pages 51-64.
    10. Admati, Anat R & Pfleiderer, Paul & Zechner, Josef, 1994. "Large Shareholder Activism, Risk Sharing, and Financial Market Equilibrium," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(6), pages 1097-1130, December.
    11. Kedia, Simi & Rajgopal, Shiva, 2011. "Do the SEC's enforcement preferences affect corporate misconduct?," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 259-278, April.
    12. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1986. "Large Shareholders and Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 461-488, June.
    13. Kim, Incheol & Miller, Steve & Wan, Hong & Wang, Bin, 2016. "Drivers behind the monitoring effectiveness of global institutional investors: Evidence from earnings management," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 24-46.
    14. Demsetz, Harold & Villalonga, Belen, 2001. "Ownership structure and corporate performance," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 209-233, September.
    15. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1998. "Law and Finance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(6), pages 1113-1155, December.
    16. Alex Edmans, 2009. "Blockholder Trading, Market Efficiency, and Managerial Myopia," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 64(6), pages 2481-2513, December.
    17. Holderness, Clifford G. & Sheehan, Dennis P., 1985. "Raiders or saviors? The evidence on six controversial investors," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 555-555, December.
    18. Alex Edmans & Gustavo Manso, 2011. "Governance Through Trading and Intervention: A Theory of Multiple Blockholders," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 24(7), pages 2395-2428.
    19. Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1988. "Management ownership and market valuation : An empirical analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 293-315, January.
    20. repec:bla:jfinan:v:59:y:2004:i:2:p:537-600 is not listed on IDEAS
    21. Bradley, Michael & Brav, Alon & Goldstein, Itay & Jiang, Wei, 2010. "Activist arbitrage: A study of open-ending attempts of closed-end funds," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(1), pages 1-19, January.
    22. Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1988. "Management ownership and market valuation," Scholarly Articles 29407535, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    23. Christian Leuz & Karl V. Lins & Francis E. Warnock, 2010. "Do Foreigners Invest Less in Poorly Governed Firms?," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 23(3), pages 3245-3285, March.
    24. Allen, Eric J. & Larson, Chad R. & Sloan, Richard G., 2013. "Accrual reversals, earnings and stock returns," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 113-129.
    25. Faccio, Mara & Lang, Larry H. P., 2002. "The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 365-395, September.
    26. Ralph De Haas & Neeltje Van Horen, 2012. "International Shock Transmission after the Lehman Brothers Collapse: Evidence from Syndicated Lending," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(3), pages 231-237, May.
    27. Djankov, Simeon & La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei, 2008. "The law and economics of self-dealing," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3), pages 430-465, June.
    28. Renée B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, 2007. "A Theory of Friendly Boards," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 62(1), pages 217-250, February.
    29. David Hirshleifer & Siew Hong Teoh & Jeff Jiewei Yu, 2011. "Short Arbitrage, Return Asymmetry, and the Accrual Anomaly," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 24(7), pages 2429-2461.
    30. Jeong†Bon Kim & Cheong H. Yi, 2006. "Ownership Structure, Business Group Affiliation, Listing Status, and Earnings Management: Evidence from Korea," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 23(2), pages 427-464, June.
    31. Alex Edmans, 2014. "Blockholders and Corporate Governance," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 6(1), pages 23-50, December.
    32. Ruth V. Aguilera & Igor Filatotchev & Howard Gospel & Gregory Jackson, 2008. "An Organizational Approach to Comparative Corporate Governance: Costs, Contingencies, and Complementarities," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 19(3), pages 475-492, June.
    33. Dechow, Patricia & Ge, Weili & Schrand, Catherine, 2010. "Understanding earnings quality: A review of the proxies, their determinants and their consequences," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2-3), pages 344-401, December.
    34. Clifford G. Holderness, 2009. "The Myth of Diffuse Ownership in the United States," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(4), pages 1377-1408, April.
    35. Leuz, Christian & Nanda, Dhananjay & Wysocki, Peter D., 2003. "Earnings management and investor protection: an international comparison," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 505-527, September.
    36. repec:bla:jfinan:v:53:y:1998:i:1:p:65-98 is not listed on IDEAS
    37. Jun-Koo Kang & Jin-Mo Kim, 2010. "Do foreign investors exhibit a corporate governance disadvantage? An information asymmetry perspective," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 41(8), pages 1415-1438, October.
    38. Fan, Joseph P. H. & Wong, T. J., 2002. "Corporate ownership structure and the informativeness of accounting earnings in East Asia," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 401-425, August.
    39. Ralph De Haas & Neeltje Van Horen, 2012. "International shock transmission after the Lehman Brothers collapse – evidence from syndicated lending," Working Papers 142, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Office of the Chief Economist.
    40. Aggarwal, Reena & Erel, Isil & Ferreira, Miguel & Matos, Pedro, 2011. "Does governance travel around the world? Evidence from institutional investors," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 154-181, April.
    41. McConnell, John J. & Servaes, Henri, 1990. "Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 595-612, October.
    42. Lins, Karl V., 2003. "Equity Ownership and Firm Value in Emerging Markets," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 38(1), pages 159-184, March.
    43. Holderness, Clifford G. & Sheehan, Dennis P., 1988. "The role of majority shareholders in publicly held corporations : An exploratory analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 317-346, January.
    44. Dechun Wang, 2006. "Founding Family Ownership and Earnings Quality," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(3), pages 619-656, June.
    45. Henrik Cronqvist & Rüdiger Fahlenbrach, 2009. "Large Shareholders and Corporate Policies," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(10), pages 3941-3976, October.
    46. Jones, Jj, 1991. "Earnings Management During Import Relief Investigations," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(2), pages 193-228.
    47. Coles, Jeffrey L. & Daniel, Naveen D. & Naveen, Lalitha, 2008. "Boards: Does one size fit all," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(2), pages 329-356, February.
    48. Cong Wang & Fei Xie, 2009. "Corporate Governance Transfer and Synergistic Gains from Mergers and Acquisitions," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(2), pages 829-858, February.
    49. Jun‐Koo Kang & Jin‐Mo Kim, 2008. "The Geography of Block Acquisitions," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 63(6), pages 2817-2858, December.
    50. Kothari, S.P. & Leone, Andrew J. & Wasley, Charles E., 2005. "Performance matched discretionary accrual measures," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 163-197, February.
    51. Guthrie, Katherine & Sokolowsky, Jan, 2010. "Large shareholders and the pressure to manage earnings," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 302-319, June.
    52. Ayers, Benjamin C. & Ramalingegowda, Santhosh & Eric Yeung, P., 2011. "Hometown advantage: The effects of monitoring institution location on financial reporting discretion," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 41-61, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Xueyan Dong & Jingyu Gao & Sunny Li Sun & Kangtao Ye, 2021. "Doing extreme by doing good," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 291-315, March.
    2. Alexandre Garel & Jose Martin-Flores & Arthur Petit-Romec & Ayesha Scott, 2021. "Institutional investor distraction and earnings management," Post-Print hal-03096196, HAL.
    3. Khine Kyaw & Steen Thomsen & Sirimon Treepongkaruna, 2022. "Firms' potential for economic sustainability and firm value: The moderating role of blockholders," Sustainable Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 30(5), pages 884-901, October.
    4. Hossain, Mohammed Sawkat, 2021. "Merger & Acquisitions (M&As) as an important strategic vehicle in business: Thematic areas, research avenues & possible suggestions," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 116(C).
    5. Garel, Alexandre & Martin-Flores, Jose M. & Petit-Romec, Arthur & Scott, Ayesha, 2021. "Institutional investor distraction and earnings management," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
    6. Hyejeong Shin & Su-In Kim, 2018. "The Effect of Corporate Governance on Earnings Quality and Market Reaction to Low Quality Earnings: Korean Evidence," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(1), pages 1-17, December.
    7. Artikis, Panagiotis G. & Diamantopoulou, Lydia & Papanastasopoulos, Georgios A. & Sorros, John N., 2022. "Asset growth and stock returns in european equity markets: Implications of investment and accounting distortions," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Edmans, Alex & Holderness, Clifford, 2016. "Blockholders: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 11442, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Belén Gill de Albornoz Noguer & Simona Rusanescu, 2017. "Foreign ownership and financial reporting quality in private subsidiaries," Working Papers. Serie EC 2017-02, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    3. Ugur Lel, 2019. "The role of foreign institutional investors in restraining earnings management activities across countries," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 50(6), pages 895-922, August.
    4. Alex Edmans, 2014. "Blockholders and Corporate Governance," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 6(1), pages 23-50, December.
    5. Zeineb Barka & Taher Hamza, 2020. "The effect of large controlling shareholders on equity prices in France: monitoring or entrenchment?," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 24(3), pages 769-798, September.
    6. Sanggyu Kang & Chune Young Chung & Amirhossein Fard, 2024. "Does geographic or market proximity matter? Evidence from institutional investor monitoring on earnings attributes in US cross‐listed stocks," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 76(2), pages 443-469, April.
    7. He, Wen & Li, Donghui & Shen, Jianfeng & Zhang, Bohui, 2013. "Large foreign ownership and stock price informativeness around the world," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 211-230.
    8. Khosa,Amrinder & Ahmed,Kamran & Henry,Darren, 2019. "Ownership Structure, Related Party Transactions, and Firm Valuation," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781108492195, October.
    9. Ferrell, Allen & Liang, Hao & Renneboog, Luc, 2016. "Socially responsible firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 122(3), pages 585-606.
    10. Lionel Almeida, 2015. "Who are the controlling shareholders? Degree and seniority of control, and CEO pay monitoring," Working Papers hal-04141391, HAL.
    11. Richardson, Grant & Wang, Bei & Zhang, Xinmin, 2016. "Ownership structure and corporate tax avoidance: Evidence from publicly listed private firms in China," Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 141-158.
    12. Jiang, Fuxiu & Ma, Yunbiao & Wang, Xue, 2020. "Multiple blockholders and earnings management," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    13. Hamadi, Malika & Heinen, Andréas, 2015. "Firm performance when ownership is very concentrated: Evidence from a semiparametric panel," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 172-194.
    14. Attig, Najah & Chen, Ruiyuan & El Ghoul, Sadok & Guedhami, Omrane & Kwok, Chuck & Pittman, Jeffrey, 2020. "Are insiders equal? Evidence from earnings management in closely held East Asian firms," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).
    15. Ferrell, Allen & Liang, Hao & Renneboog, Luc, 2016. "Socially responsible firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 122(3), pages 585-606.
    16. repec:dau:papers:123456789/5922 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Fuxiu Jiang & Kenneth A Kim, 2020. "Corporate Governance in China: A Survey [The role of boards of directors in corporate governance: a conceptual framework and survey]," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 24(4), pages 733-772.
    18. Yasean A. Tahat & Ahmed H. Ahmed & David Power, 2022. "Earnings quality and investment efficiency: the role of the institutional settings," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 58(3), pages 1277-1306, April.
    19. Rossi, Fabrizio & Barth, James R. & Cebula, Richard J., 2018. "Do shareholder coalitions affect agency costs? Evidence from Italian-listed companies," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 181-200.
    20. Jara-Bertin, Mauricio & López-Iturriaga, Félix J., 2008. "Earnings Management and Contest to the Control: An Analysis of European Family Firms," MPRA Paper 9660, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    21. Cheng, Minying & Lin, Bingxuan & Wei, Minghai, 2013. "How does the relationship between multiple large shareholders affect corporate valuations? Evidence from China," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 43-70.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Block acquisition; Governance transfer; Earnings management; International financial markets;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G15 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - International Financial Markets
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:corfin:v:45:y:2017:i:c:p:586-607. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jcorpfin .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.