IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/corfin/v26y2014icp36-56.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Competition and dynamics of takeover contests

Author

Listed:
  • Calcagno, Riccardo
  • Falconieri, Sonia

Abstract

This paper investigates the effect of potential competition on takeovers which we model as a bargaining game with alternating offers where calling an auction represents an outside option for each bidder at each stage of the game. The model describes a takeover process that is initiated by an unsolicited bidder, and it aims to answer three main questions: who wins the takeover and how? when? and how much is the takeover premium?

Suggested Citation

  • Calcagno, Riccardo & Falconieri, Sonia, 2014. "Competition and dynamics of takeover contests," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 26(C), pages 36-56.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:corfin:v:26:y:2014:i:c:p:36-56
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2014.02.003
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0929119914000145
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2014.02.003?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. Avner Shaked, 1994. "Opting out: bazaars versus "hi tech" markets," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 18(3), pages 421-432, September.
    3. Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, 2009. "Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(4), pages 1544-1575, September.
    4. repec:bla:jfinan:v:44:y:1989:i:1:p:41-57 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Audra L. Boone & J. Harold Mulherin, 2009. "Is There One Best Way to Sell a Company? Auctions Versus Negotiations and Controlled Sales1," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 21(3), pages 28-37, June.
    6. Officer, Micah S., 2003. "Termination fees in mergers and acquisitions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 431-467, September.
    7. Michael J. Fishman, 1988. "A Theory of Preemptive Takeover Bidding," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(1), pages 88-101, Spring.
    8. Perry Motty & Reny Philip J., 1993. "A Non-cooperative Bargaining Model with Strategically Timed Offers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 50-77, February.
    9. Audra L. Boone & J. Harold Mulherin, 2007. "Do Termination Provisions Truncate the Takeover Bidding Process?," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 20(2), pages 461-489.
    10. Berkovitch, Elazar & Khanna, Naveen, 1991. "A Theory of Acquisition Markets: Mergers versus Tender Offers, and Golden Parachutes," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 4(1), pages 149-174.
    11. Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, 2009. "Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(4), pages 1544-75, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Gino Loyola & Yolanda Portilla, 2016. "A Bargaining Model of Friendly and Hostile Takeovers," International Review of Finance, International Review of Finance Ltd., vol. 16(2), pages 291-306, June.
    2. Tarsalewska, Monika, 2018. "Buyouts under the threat of preemption," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 39-58.
    3. Glambosky, Mina & Gleason, Kimberly & Murdock, Maryna, 2015. "Political risk and the factors that affect international bids," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 68-83.
    4. Lukas, Elmar & Pereira, Paulo J. & Rodrigues, Artur, 2023. "On the determinants of the dynamic choice between mergers and tender offers," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
    5. Renneboog, Luc & Vansteenkiste, Cara, 2017. "Leveraged Buyouts : A Survey of the Literature," Other publications TiSEM 573ebdd5-a720-4110-8ed1-e, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    6. Robert W. Faff & Abeyratna Gunasekarage & Syed M. M. Shams, 2020. "Does takeover competition affect acquisition choices and bidding firm performance? Australian evidence," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 60(4), pages 3581-3619, December.
    7. He, Xinming & Zhang, Jianhong, 2018. "Emerging market MNCs' cross-border acquisition completion: Institutional image and strategies," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 139-150.
    8. Simonyan, Karen, 2014. "What determines takeover premia: An empirical analysis," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 93-125.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Liu, Tingting & Mulherin, J. Harold, 2018. "How has takeover competition changed over time?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 104-119.
    2. Bessler, Wolfgang & Schneck, Colin & Zimmermann, Jan, 2015. "Bidder contests in international mergers and acquisitions: The impact of toeholds, preemptive bidding, and termination fees," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 4-23.
    3. Dimopoulos, Theodosios & Sacchetto, Stefano, 2014. "Preemptive bidding, target resistance, and takeover premiums," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 114(3), pages 444-470.
    4. Gentry, Matthew & Stroup, Caleb, 2019. "Entry and competition in takeover auctions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 132(2), pages 298-324.
    5. Aktas, Nihat & de Bodt, Eric & Roll, Richard, 2010. "Negotiations under the threat of an auction," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 98(2), pages 241-255, November.
    6. Schneck, Colin & Bessler, Wolfgang & Zimmermann, Jan, 2014. "Bidder Contests in International Mergers and Acquisitions: The Impact of Toeholds, Preemptive Bidding, and Termination Fees," VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100493, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    7. Pietro Bonetti & Miguel Duro & Gaizka Ormazabal, 2020. "Disclosure Regulation and Corporate Acquisitions," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(1), pages 55-103, March.
    8. Chira, Inga & Volkov, Nikanor, 2017. "The choice of sale method and its consequences in mergers and acquisitions," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 170-184.
    9. Becker, Jan U. & Clement, Michel & Nöth, Markus, 2016. "Start-ups, incumbents, and the effects of takeover competition," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 69(12), pages 5925-5933.
    10. Fidrmuc, Jana P. & Roosenboom, Peter & Paap, Richard & Teunissen, Tim, 2012. "One size does not fit all: Selling firms to private equity versus strategic acquirers," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 828-848.
    11. Weitzel, Utz & Kling, Gerhard, 2012. "Sold below value? Why some targets accept very low and even negative takeover premiums," MPRA Paper 42832, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Eckbo, B. Espen, 2009. "Bidding strategies and takeover premiums: A review," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 149-178, February.
    13. Offenberg, David & Pirinsky, Christo, 2015. "How do acquirers choose between mergers and tender offers?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 116(2), pages 331-348.
    14. Loyola, Gino, 2012. "Optimal and efficient takeover contests with toeholds," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 203-216.
    15. Renneboog, Luc & Vansteenkiste, Cara, 2019. "Failure and success in mergers and acquisitions," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 650-699.
    16. Chang, Xin & Shekhar, Chander & Tam, Lewis H.K. & Yao, Jiaquan, 2016. "The information role of advisors in mergers and acquisitions: Evidence from acquirers hiring targets’ ex-advisors," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 247-264.
    17. Schlingemann, Frederik & Wu, Hong, 2015. "Determinants and shareholder wealth effects of the sales method in acquisitions," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 469-485.
    18. Aktas, Nihat & Xu, Guosong & Yurtoglu, Burcin, 2018. "She is mine: Determinants and value effects of early announcements in takeovers," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 180-202.
    19. Aktas, Nihat & de Bodt, Eric & Roll, Richard, 2011. "Serial acquirer bidding: An empirical test of the learning hypothesis," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 18-32, February.
    20. Loyola, Gino, 2012. "Auctions vs. negotiations in takeovers with initial stakes," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 111-120.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Takeover negotiations; Auctions; Bargaining; Outside option;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:corfin:v:26:y:2014:i:c:p:36-56. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jcorpfin .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.