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How much is reasonable? The size of termination fees in mergers and acquisitions

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  • Jeon, Jin Q.
  • Ligon, James A.

Abstract

We investigate termination fee size in mergers. Although the deal premium does not significantly affect fee size, smaller targets and targets with lower institutional ownership offer larger fees. Low or moderate fees do not eliminate post-announcement competing bids, while large fees do. Fee size is generally positively correlated with deal completion. However, large fees are negatively correlated with the consummation of high-premium deals. Fee size is generally unrelated to announcement-date cumulative abnormal returns. However, returns are significantly lower for deals including fees larger than 5%. Overall, the study provides evidence that low- or moderate-size fees serve as efficient contractual devices, while large fees are less beneficial to shareholders and therefore tend to suggest agency conflicts.

Suggested Citation

  • Jeon, Jin Q. & Ligon, James A., 2011. "How much is reasonable? The size of termination fees in mergers and acquisitions," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 959-981, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:corfin:v:17:y:2011:i:4:p:959-981
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    Cited by:

    1. Neyland, Jordan & Shekhar, Chander, 2018. "How much is too much? Large termination fees and target distress," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 97-112.
    2. Jin Q Jeon & Cheolwoo Lee, 2014. "Effective Post-Signing Market Check or Window Dressing? The Role of Go-Shop Provisions in M&A Transactions," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(1-2), pages 210-241, January.
    3. Ryoo, Juyoun & Jeon, Jin Q. & Lee, Cheolwoo, 2016. "Do marketing activities enhance firm value? Evidence from M&A transactions," European Management Journal, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 243-257.
    4. Wolfgang Bessler & Colin Schneck, 2015. "Excess premium offers and bidder success in European takeovers," Eurasian Economic Review, Springer;Eurasia Business and Economics Society, vol. 5(1), pages 23-62, June.
    5. Antoniades, Adonis & Calomiris, Charles W. & Hitscherich, Donna M., 2016. "No free shop: Why target companies sometimes choose not to buy ‘go-shop’ options," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 36-64.
    6. Schneck, Colin & Bessler, Wolfgang & Zimmermann, Jan, 2014. "Bidder Contests in International Mergers and Acquisitions: The Impact of Toeholds, Preemptive Bidding, and Termination Fees," VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100493, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    7. Tugce Karatas & Ali Hirsa, 2021. "Predicting Status of Pre and Post M&A Deals Using Machine Learning and Deep Learning Techniques," Papers 2110.09315, arXiv.org.
    8. Sridhar Gogineni & John Puthenpurackal, 2021. "Why do takeover targets protect acquirers? Evidence from force‐the‐vote provisions," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 50(3), pages 805-843, September.
    9. Denis Schweizer & Ge Wu, 2021. "Law Firm expertise and shareholder wealth," Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 30(4), pages 129-163, November.
    10. Yue Liu, 2019. "Shareholder wealth effects of M&A withdrawals," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 52(3), pages 681-716, April.
    11. Sridhar Gogineni & Pawan Jain, 2021. "The Role of Target Termination Fees in REIT Mergers," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 63(1), pages 1-39, July.
    12. Lee, Kangbok & Joo, Sunghoon & Baik, Hyeoncheol & Han, Sumin & In, Joonhwan, 2020. "Unbalanced data, type II error, and nonlinearity in predicting M&A failure," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 271-287.
    13. Adra, Samer & Barbopoulos, Leonidas G. & Saunders, Anthony, 2020. "The impact of monetary policy on M&A outcomes," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    14. Bessler, Wolfgang & Schneck, Colin & Zimmermann, Jan, 2015. "Bidder contests in international mergers and acquisitions: The impact of toeholds, preemptive bidding, and termination fees," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 4-23.
    15. Deepak Kumar & Keya Sengupta & Mousumi Bhattacharya, 2023. "M&A Negotiations: Role of Negotiation Process, Ownership and Advisors on Deal Completion," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 32(5), pages 1083-1115, October.

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