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A model of the supply of executives for outside directorships

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  • Conyon, Martin J.
  • Read, Laura E.

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  • Conyon, Martin J. & Read, Laura E., 2006. "A model of the supply of executives for outside directorships," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 645-659, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:corfin:v:12:y:2006:i:3:p:645-659
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    1. Stephen P. Ferris & Murali Jagannathan & A. C. Pritchard, 2003. "Too Busy to Mind the Business? Monitoring by Directors with Multiple Board Appointments," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(3), pages 1087-1111, June.
    2. Smith, Clifford Jr. & Watts, Ross L., 1992. "The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 263-292, December.
    3. Beetsma, Roel & Peters, Hans & Rebers, Eugene, 2000. "When to fire bad managers: the role of collusion between management and board of directors," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(4), pages 427-444, August.
    4. Berry, Tammy K. & Paige Fields, L. & Wilkins, Michael S., 2006. "The interaction among multiple governance mechanisms in young newly public firms," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 449-466, June.
    5. Hermalin, Benjamin E & Weisbach, Michael S, 1998. "Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directors and Their Monitoring of the CEO," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 96-118, March.
    6. Warther, Vincent A., 1998. "Board effectiveness and board dissent: A model of the board's relationship to management and shareholders," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 4(1), pages 53-70, March.
    7. Rosenstein, Stuart & Wyatt, Jeffrey G., 1990. "Outside directors, board independence, and shareholder wealth," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 175-191, August.
    8. Eldenburg, Leslie & Hermalin, Benjamin E. & Weisbach, Michael S. & Wosinska, Marta, 2004. "Governance, performance objectives and organizational form: evidence from hospitals," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 527-548, September.
    9. Fich, Eliezer M. & White, Lawrence J., 2005. "Why do CEOs reciprocally sit on each other's boards?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 11(1-2), pages 175-195, March.
    10. repec:bla:jfinan:v:59:y:2004:i:5:p:2281-2308 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 2003. "Boards of directors as an endogenously determined institution: a survey of the economic literature," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 9(Apr), pages 7-26.
    12. Brick, Ivan E. & Palmon, Oded & Wald, John K., 2006. "CEO compensation, director compensation, and firm performance: Evidence of cronyism?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 403-423, June.
    13. Anil Shivdasani & David Yermack, 1999. "CEO Involvement in the Selection of New Board Members: An Empirical Analysis," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(5), pages 1829-1853, October.
    14. repec:bla:jfinan:v:58:y:2003:i:3:p:1087-1112 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Arthur, N., 2001. "Board composition as the outcome of an internal bargaining process: empirical evidence," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 307-340, September.
    16. Dahya, Jay & McConnell, John J., 2005. "Outside directors and corporate board decisions," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 11(1-2), pages 37-60, March.
    17. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-325, June.
    18. Booth, James R. & Deli, Daniel N., 1996. "Factors affecting the number of outside directorships held by CEOs," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 81-104, January.
    19. Yuval Deutsch & Thomas W. Ross, 2003. "You are Known by the Directors You Keep: Reputable Directors as a Signaling Mechanism for Young Firms," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 49(8), pages 1003-1017, August.
    20. Stuart Rosenstein & Jeffrey G. Wyatt, 1994. "Shareholder wealth effects when an officer of one corporation joins the board of directors of another," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 15(4), pages 317-327, July/Augu.
    21. Deli, Daniel N. & Gillan, Stuart L., 2000. "On the demand for independent and active audit committees," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 6(4), pages 427-445, December.
    22. Danielson, Morris G. & Karpoff, Jonathan M., 2006. "Do pills poison operating performance?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 536-559, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Renee B. Adams & Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 2010. "The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 48(1), pages 58-107, March.
    2. Renneboog, Luc & Zhao, Yang, 2011. "Us knows us in the UK: On director networks and CEO compensation," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 1132-1157, September.
    3. Balsmeier, Benjamin & Buchwald, Achim & Stiebale, Joel, 2014. "Outside directors on the board and innovative firm performance," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 43(10), pages 1800-1815.
    4. Balsmeier, Benjamin & Buchwald, Achim & Peters, Heiko, 2009. "Auswirkungen von Mehrfachmandaten deutscher Vorstands- und Aufsichtsratsvorsitzender auf den Unternehmenserfolg," Working Papers 01/2009, German Council of Economic Experts / Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung.
    5. Brick, Ivan E. & Palmon, Oded & Wald, John K., 2006. "CEO compensation, director compensation, and firm performance: Evidence of cronyism?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 403-423, June.
    6. Flora Niu & Greg Berberich, 2015. "Director tenure and busyness and corporate governance," International Journal of Corporate Governance, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 6(1), pages 56-69.
    7. Ting-Kai Chou & Hsuan-Ling Feng, 2019. "Multiple directorships and the value of cash holdings," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 53(3), pages 663-699, October.
    8. Oliver Bischoff & Achim Buchwald, 2018. "Horizontal and Vertical Firm Networks, Corporate Performance and Product Market Competition," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 25-45, March.
    9. John Byrd & L. Ann Martin & Subhrendu Rath, 2010. "The shareholder wealth effects of an executive joining another company's Board," International Journal of Managerial Finance, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 6(1), pages 48-57, February.
    10. Michele Bernini & Georgios Efthyvoulou & Ian Gregory-Smith & Jolian McHardy & Antonio Navas, 2021. "Interlocking directorships and patenting coordination," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 30(4), pages 382-411, May.
    11. Canan C. Mutlu & Sunay Mutlu & Steve Sauerwald, 2021. "CEO outside directorships and managerial efficiency: The role of host board capital," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(1), pages 45-66, January.
    12. Balsmeier, Benjamin & Buchwald, Achim & Peters, Heiko, 2011. "Outside board memberships of CEOs: Expertise or entrenchment?," DICE Discussion Papers 26, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    13. Buchwald, Achim, 2015. "Competition, outside directors and executive turnover: Implications for corporate governance in the EU," DICE Discussion Papers 174, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    14. Buchwald, Achim, 2012. "Welche Unternehmen berufen Vorstandsvorsitzende und andere Vorstände als externe Kontrolleure? Eine empirische Analyse der Präsenz von externen Vorständen in den Aufsichtsräten deutscher Grossunterneh," Die Unternehmung - Swiss Journal of Business Research and Practice, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, vol. 66(2), pages 93-126.
    15. Sarfraz Khan & Elaine Mauldin, 2021. "Benefit or burden? A comparison of CFO and CEO outside directorships," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(7-8), pages 1175-1214, July.
    16. Volonté, Christophe, 2015. "Boards: Independent and committed directors?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 25-37.
    17. Ryan Krause & Matthew Semadeni & Michael C. Withers, 2016. "That special someone: When the board views its chair as a resource," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(9), pages 1990-2002, September.
    18. Marwa Elnahass & Kamil Omoteso & Aly Salama & Vu Quang Trinh, 2020. "Differential market valuations of board busyness across alternative banking models," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 55(1), pages 201-238, July.
    19. Basuil, Dynah A. & Datta, Deepak K., 2017. "Value creation in cross-border acquisitions: The role of outside directors' human and social capital," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 35-44.

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