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The universal probabilistic reward based on the difference of payoff realizes the evolution of cooperation

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  • Ohdaira, Tetsushi

Abstract

Many previous studies regarding the theoretical models of social dilemmas have described that rewarding opponents can help players to cooperate with each other. Those studies deal with reward not for defectors, but for cooperators. However, many prior researches concerning punishment that is also considered to be necessary for the evolution of cooperation discuss punishment on cooperators as well as defectors. Considering the group level, defectors who have too much payoff due to many cooperators around them will lose their superiority over cooperators by rewarding not only cooperators but also defectors surrounding them. As a result, cooperation among players can be realized.

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  • Ohdaira, Tetsushi, 2024. "The universal probabilistic reward based on the difference of payoff realizes the evolution of cooperation," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 182(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:chsofr:v:182:y:2024:i:c:s0960077924003060
    DOI: 10.1016/j.chaos.2024.114754
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    References listed on IDEAS

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