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Conformity versus credibility: A coupled rumor-belief model

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  • Zhang, Wei
  • Brandes, Ulrik

Abstract

The opinion individuals hold about circulating information moderates their spreading behavior, as they may choose to spread rumors they believe in and remain silent about those they do not. Meanwhile, these opinions may be influenced by peers’ opinions and observed behaviors. We present coupled dynamics that integrate opinion formation and information spreading within two-layer multiplex social networks. In an influence layer, opinions are shaped by information credibility and social influence, the degree of which is determined by individual tendencies to conform. In a communication layer, information spreads conditioned on whether individuals believe in it. Using analytical and numerical tools, we demonstrate consistent behavior of the model by identifying the criteria for an evolutionary advantage in opinion formation and a critical spreading rate for rumor outbreaks. We then proceeded to examine two scenarios distinguished by considering credibility as either an intrinsic or a social property of information. Our results show that, for intrinsic credibility, higher degrees of conformity promote the spread of incredible information and inhibit the diffusion of credible information; for social credibility, higher degrees of conformity have an amplifying effect on the evolution of belief and rumor spreading. Additionally, the former scenario exhibits rich behaviors in the interplay between opinion evolution and information spreading, including paradigm shift, passive support, and fringe belief. We thus contribute to the understanding of the dynamics of opinion formation and information propagation in social groups. Empirical application may inform efforts to assess and combat the spread of misinformation.

Suggested Citation

  • Zhang, Wei & Brandes, Ulrik, 2023. "Conformity versus credibility: A coupled rumor-belief model," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 176(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:chsofr:v:176:y:2023:i:c:s0960077923010743
    DOI: 10.1016/j.chaos.2023.114172
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    References listed on IDEAS

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