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Democratic participation, fiscal reform and local governance: Empirical evidence on Chinese villages

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  • Meng, Xiangyi
  • Zhang, Li

Abstract

China's rural village elections have been acclaimed as a crucial step in China's democratization and a success in improving villagers' welfare and self-governance. Around 2002 the central government implemented another influential reform: the Tax-for-Fee reform. Using a unique two-year panel of village data from rural China covering more villages than the previous literature and spanning over these two reforms, our dual-goal in this paper is, first to evaluate the impact of village election on local governance, and second to examine the potential interplay between the Tax-for-Fee reform and the village election. We show empirically that village elections do bring about positive consequences, including the enhancement of public expenditure and the improvement in efficiency in public administration, through the check and balances provided by the villagers' representatives meetings. However, the improvement in administrative efficiency has been partly unexpectedly attenuated by the Tax-for-Fee reform. We argue that this conflict is possibly due to the Tax-for-Fee reform's tightening up the villages' budget and that with sticky administration costs, the reduction of administrative share in total expenditure has been weakened. Therefore the tax reform undermines the functioning of village democracy.

Suggested Citation

  • Meng, Xiangyi & Zhang, Li, 2011. "Democratic participation, fiscal reform and local governance: Empirical evidence on Chinese villages," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 88-97, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:chieco:v:22:y:2011:i:1:p:88-97
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Nicola Persico & Alessandro Lizzeri, 2001. "The Provision of Public Goods under Alternative Electoral Incentives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(1), pages 225-239, March.
    2. Gustafsson,Björn A. & Shi,Li & Sicular,Terry (ed.), 2008. "Inequality and Public Policy in China," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521870450, September.
    3. Luo, Renfu & Zhang, Linxiu & Huang, Jikun & Rozelle, Scott, 2007. "Elections, fiscal reform and public goods provision in rural China," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 583-611, September.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Li, Shi & Vendryes, Thomas, 2018. "Real estate activity, democracy and land rights in rural China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 54-79.
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    4. Ma, Meilin, 2023. "Interdependent investments in attached and movable assets under insecure land rights," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
    5. Caldeira, Emilie, 2012. "Yardstick competition in a federation: Theory and evidence from China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 878-897.
    6. Junxue Jia & Cong Qin & Yongzheng Liu, 2017. "Do Community-Based Development Projects Alleviate Poverty? Evidence from Rural China," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper1722, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    7. James Alm & Yongzheng Liu, 2013. "Did China's Tax-for-Fee Reform Improve Farmers' Welfare in Rural Areas?," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 49(4), pages 516-532, April.
    8. James Alm & Yongzheng Liu, 2014. "China's Tax-for-Fee Reform and Village Inequality," Oxford Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 42(1), pages 38-64, March.
    9. Suwen Zheng & Chunhui Ye & Yunli Bai, 2023. "Does Supervision Down to the Countryside Level Benefit Rural Public Goods Supply? Evidence on the Extent of Households’ Satisfaction with Public Goods from 2005 to 2019," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(11), pages 1-34, May.
    10. Ding, Haoyuan & Qin, Cong & Shi, Kang, 2018. "Who benefit from government-led microfinance projects? Evidence from rural China," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(4), pages 1253-1272.
    11. Zhang, Jing & Gan, Li & Xu, Lixin Colin & Yao, Yang, 2014. "Health shocks, village elections, and household income: Evidence from rural China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 155-168.
    12. Lu, Jie, 2015. "Varieties of Governance in China: Migration and Institutional Change in Chinese Villages," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199378746.
    13. Jinrui Xi & Feng Wen, 2019. "Sustainable Rural Governance: How Rural Elections in China Lead to Long-Term Social Stability?," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(22), pages 1-13, November.

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