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Formally shaming white-collar criminals

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  • Ivancevich, John M.
  • Konopaske, Robert
  • Gilbert, Jacqueline A.

Abstract

The dust has settled, and the 2001-2002 corporate scandals are in the rearview mirror for most executives and managers. There is, however, still an upward trend in white-collar crime, which can negatively affect everything from investor confidence, to stockholder embarrassment, to the degree to which the public views the firm's social responsibility and reputation. We find that formal shaming sanctions are slowly being added to the traditional punishment options of fines and incarceration for convicted white-collar offenders. Sentencing judges, courts, legislatures, convicted criminals, and the public have little understanding of the deterrence impact, if any, of shaming sanctions. This article attempts to clarify what shaming sanctions are, why white-collar personnel should become more familiar with the array of shaming punishments being utilized, and how shaming sanctions are being used to deal with white-collar offenders.

Suggested Citation

  • Ivancevich, John M. & Konopaske, Robert & Gilbert, Jacqueline A., 2008. "Formally shaming white-collar criminals," Business Horizons, Elsevier, vol. 51(5), pages 401-410.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:bushor:v:51:y:2008:i:5:p:401-410
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Kahan, Dan M & Posner, Eric A, 1999. "Shaming White-Collar Criminals: A Proposal for Reform of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(1), pages 365-391, April.
    4. Kayes, D. Christopher & Stirling, David & Nielsen, Tjai M., 2007. "Building organizational integrity," Business Horizons, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 61-70.
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    Cited by:

    1. Edson Costa Alves & Marcia Juliana d’Angelo, 2023. "Does the Signaling of Hiring Offenders Impact Corporate Reputation?," Corporate Reputation Review, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 26(2), pages 133-149, May.

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