How to break carbon lock-in of thermal power industry in China—A tripartite evolutionary game analysis

Moving away from a carbon-intensive power supply over the next few decades requires a commitment to both reduce power-related carbon emissions and ensure a secure and affordable power supply in China. However, thermal power still contributes to roughly 70 % of the electricity generated in China, and the carbon lock-in in thermal power hampers the realization of low carbon transition of power systems. In this context, this paper employs a tripartite evolutionary game model to explore the strategies of breaking carbon lock-in in thermal power generation among the power plants and China's central and local governments. Three scenarios were designed considering both CCS installation and economic incentives. Numerical simulations show neither power plants nor the local government has the motivation to decarbonize power generation in baseline scenario. Under the single decarbonization strategy scenario, only relying on technological progress, carbon trading or subsidy is infeasible to incentive decarbonization due to high cost. When the three strategies are combinedly used, carbon lock-in can be broken. Therefore, the combined decarbonization strategy that integrates reducing technology cost, increasing carbon trading price, and subsidy is recommended for the decarbonization of thermal power. Moreover, the selection of a proper decarbonization strategy should be based on local situation.