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Educational decentralization models in Latin America

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  • Di Gropello, Emanuela

Abstract

Decentralization of social services is one of the central elements of the social policy reforms being carried out in Latin America in order to make the provision of such services more efficient and to strengthen the democratization processes. This article analyses the processes of decentralization of education in seven Latin American countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Nicaragua);. It seeks to systematize these experiences, using a theoretical typology of reform models; to present some results and trends in terms of the efficiency and equity of the provision of these services, and to extract some useful lessons for the design of future reforms. Although the models developed in the various countries differ from each other, they nevertheless have some common features: they depend on the resources provided by the central level to finance the services, and in many cases they subordinate schools to decisions taken at other levels. Among the main economic and social effects of the reforms are the limited progress made in participation and, hence, social efficiency; the ambiguous results obtained in terms of technical efficiency, and a trend which is not yet fully confirmed towards greater inter-territorial disparities in educational indicators. Among the lessons for policy formulation is the importance of giving the new levels of supply some degree of real autonomy, using a system of transfers which encourages a quest for efficiency while at the same time safeguarding equity, taking care to preserve the internal coherence of the models, giving some responsibilities directly to the schools, and ensuring that there is a suitable framework for the regulation and supervision of decentralized service supply systems.

Suggested Citation

  • Di Gropello, Emanuela, 1999. "Educational decentralization models in Latin America," Revista CEPAL, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), August.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecr:col070:10692
    Note: Includes bibliography
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    2. Espinoza, José & Marcel, Mario, 1994. "Descentralización fiscal: el caso chileno," Series Históricas 9520, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL).
    3. Rees, Ray, 1985. "The Theory of Principal and Agent: Part 2," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(2), pages 75-95, May.
    4. Jeni Klugman, 1994. "Decentralization: A Survey of Literature from a Human Development Perspective," Human Development Occasional Papers (1992-2007) HDOCPA-1994-05, Human Development Report Office (HDRO), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).
    5. Porto, Alberto & Sanguinetti, Pablo, 1996. "Las transferencias intergubernamentales y la equidad distributiva: el caso argentino," Series Históricas 9744, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL).
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