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Lump-Sum Payments and Profit-Sharing Plans in the Union Sector of the United States Economy

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  • Bell, Linda A
  • Neumark, David

Abstract

Lump-sum payments and profit-sharing plans became increasingly prevalent in union contracts in the U.S. economy in the 1980s. This paper analyzes the relationship between lump-sums, profit sharing, labor costs and employment, in firm-level panel data for the union sector of the U.S. economy. In general, the firm-level data suggest that profit sharing has a statistically significant effect of lowering labor cost growth. Profit sharing also appears to increase employment growth and reduce employment variability, but these results are not statistically significant. This evidence is generally consistent with hypotheses regarding the introduction of performance-related pay (Weitzman, 1984 and 1985). The effects of lump-sums, on the other hand, are not consistent with hypotheses regarding performance-related pay. Lump-sums do not appear to lower labor cost growth or increase employment growth, and increase rather than decrease employment variability. Copyright 1993 by Royal Economic Society.

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  • Bell, Linda A & Neumark, David, 1993. "Lump-Sum Payments and Profit-Sharing Plans in the Union Sector of the United States Economy," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 103(418), pages 602-619, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:103:y:1993:i:418:p:602-19
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    Cited by:

    1. Richard J. Long & Tony Fang, 2012. "Do Employees Profit from Profit Sharing? Evidence from Canadian Panel Data," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 65(4), pages 899-927, October.
    2. Omar Azfar & Stephan Danninger, 2001. "Profit-Sharing, Employment Stability, and Wage Growth," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 54(3), pages 619-630, April.
    3. Noélie Delahaie & Richard Duhautois, 2019. "Profit‐Sharing and Wages: An Empirical Analysis Using French Data between 2000 and 2007," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 57(1), pages 107-142, March.
    4. Derek C. Jones & Takao Kato & Jeffrey Pliskin, 1994. "Profit Sharing and Gainsharing: A Review of Theory, Incidence, and Effects," Economics Working Paper Archive wp_125, Levy Economics Institute.
    5. Kraft, Kornelius & Ugarkovic, Marija, 2006. "Profit sharing and the financial performance of firms: Evidence from Germany," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 92(3), pages 333-338, September.
    6. Cardoso, Renato Fragelli, 1995. "Profit Sharing With Heterogeneous Entrepreneurial Prowess," Brazilian Review of Econometrics, Sociedade Brasileira de Econometria - SBE, vol. 15(2), November.
    7. Sandeep Bhargava & Tim Jenkinson, 1996. "Partage explicite ou implicite du profit dans la détermination des salaires," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 126(5), pages 19-29.
    8. Hamid Mehran & Joseph Tracy, 2001. "The effect of employee stock options on the evolution of compensation in the 1990s," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Dec, pages 17-34.
    9. Seppo Honkapohja & Frank Westermann, 2009. "Pay-setting Systems in Europe: Ongoing Developments and Possible Reforms," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Seppo Honkapohja & Frank Westermann (ed.), Designing the European Model, chapter 3, pages 82-121, Palgrave Macmillan.
    10. Cecilia Navarra & Ermanno Tortia, 2014. "Employer Moral Hazard, Wage Rigidity, and Worker Cooperatives: A Theoretical Appraisal," Journal of Economic Issues, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 48(3), pages 707-726.
    11. Douglas L. Kruse, 1993. "Does Profit Sharing Affect Productivity?," NBER Working Papers 4542, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Noélie Delahaie & Richard Duhautois, 2013. "L'impact des dispositifs collectifs de partage des bénéfices sur les rémunérations en France. Une analyse empirique sur la période 1999-2007," Working Papers halshs-00967479, HAL.
    13. Douglas L. Kruse, 1996. "Why Do Firms Adopt Profit-Sharing and Employee Ownership Plans?," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 34(4), pages 515-538, December.
    14. Leila Baghdadi & Rihab Bellakhal & Marc-Arthur Diaye, 2012. "Do French firms use financial participation to transfer more risk to their workers?," Documents de recherche 12-10, Centre d'Études des Politiques Économiques (EPEE), Université d'Evry Val d'Essonne.
    15. Kauhanen, Antti & Piekkola, Hannu, 2002. "Profit Sharing in Finland: Earnings and Productivity Effects," Discussion Papers 817, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy.
    16. Leila Baghdadi & Rihab Bellakhal & Marc-Arthur Diaye, 2016. "Financial Participation: Does the Risk Transfer Story Hold in France?," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 54(1), pages 3-29, March.
    17. Douglas Kruse & Joseph Blasi, 1995. "Employee Ownership, Employee Attitudes, and Firm Performance," NBER Working Papers 5277, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Cardoso, Renato Fragelli, 1995. "Profit sharing with heterogeneous entrepreneurial prowess," FGV EPGE Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 265, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil).
    19. Cardoso, Renato Fragelli, 1997. "Mandatory profit sharing, entrepreneurial incentives and capital accumulation," FGV EPGE Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 318, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil).
    20. Pablo González, 2002. "Profit Sharing Reconsidered: Efficiency Wages and Renegotiation Costs," Documentos de Trabajo 151, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
    21. Frank Scharr, 2005. "Tarifbindung, Rententeilung und Konzessionsverträge als Einflussgrößen der Lohnhöhe in Unternehmen : eine Untersuchung mit Mikrodaten für thüringische Firmen," ifo Dresden Studien, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, number 39, May.

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