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Government guarantees and the bank-sovereign nexus

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  • Leonello, Agnese

Abstract

The recent financial and sovereign debt crises showed that providing public guarantees to banks may pose serious threats to sovereign solvency, despite their short-term beneficial effects on financial stability. This article analyses the role that public guarantees to banks play in the bank-sovereign nexus and offers a more nuanced assessment of their implications for sovereign debt crises. Depending on the nature of the banking crisis and the specific characteristics of the economy, guarantees may improve financial stability without undermining sovereign solvency, thus generating a positive feedback loop between bank and sovereign stability. JEL Classification: G01, G18, H63

Suggested Citation

  • Leonello, Agnese, 2017. "Government guarantees and the bank-sovereign nexus," Research Bulletin, European Central Bank, vol. 35.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecb:ecbrbu:2017:0035:
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Emmanuel Farhi & Jean Tirole, 2018. "Deadly Embrace: Sovereign and Financial Balance Sheets Doom Loops," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 85(3), pages 1781-1823.
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    3. Russell Cooper & Kalin Nikolov, 2018. "Government Debt And Banking Fragility: The Spreading Of Strategic Uncertainty," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(4), pages 1905-1925, November.
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    5. Editorial Article, 0. "Abstracts," Economics of Contemporary Russia, Regional Public Organization for Assistance to the Development of Institutions of the Department of Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences, issue 3.
    6. Franklin Allen & Elena Carletti & Itay Goldstein & Agnese Leonello, 2015. "Moral Hazard and Government Guarantees in the Banking Industry," Journal of Financial Regulation, Oxford University Press, vol. 1(1), pages 30-50.
    7. Leonello, Agnese, 2018. "Government guarantees and the two-way feedback between banking and sovereign debt crises," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 130(3), pages 592-619.
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    Cited by:

    1. Paolo Canofari & Alessandra Marcelletti & Marcello Messori, 2020. "Redenomination Risk and Bank Runs in a Monetary Union with and Without Deposit Insurance Schemes," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 237-256, April.
    2. Rojas, Luis E. & Thaler, Dominik, 2024. "The bright side of the doom loop: Banks’ sovereign exposure and default incentives," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 170(C).
    3. Lakdawala, Aeimit & Minetti, Raoul & Olivero, María Pía, 2018. "Interbank markets and bank bailout policies amid a sovereign debt crisis," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 131-153.
    4. Luis Rojas & Dominik Thaler, 2020. "The Bright Side of the Doom Loop: Banks Exposure and Default Incentives," Working Papers 1143, Barcelona School of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    bank runs; sovereign default; strategic complementarity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt

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