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Redenomination Risk and Bank Runs in a Monetary Union with and Without Deposit Insurance Schemes

Author

Listed:
  • Paolo Canofari

    (Luiss School of European Political Economy (SEP))

  • Alessandra Marcelletti

    (Luiss School of European Political Economy (SEP))

  • Marcello Messori

    (Luiss School of European Political Economy (SEP))

Abstract

This paper develops a basic framework characterized by a monetary union in which a shock to the policy interest rate, i.e. the determinant of a recessionary stance in the monetary policy, can imply that a member state finds it worthwhile to leave this union and/or that the corresponding banks declare bankruptcy. Our aim is to analyze the various possible reactions that bank depositors may have when this shock is transmitted to the interest rates on their bank deposits. We compare these reactions in two different policy frameworks characterized either by the presence or by the absence of a Centralized Deposit Insurance Scheme (CDIS). Our model shows that the introduction of a CDIS is per se not sufficient for zeroing the probability of bank runs.

Suggested Citation

  • Paolo Canofari & Alessandra Marcelletti & Marcello Messori, 2020. "Redenomination Risk and Bank Runs in a Monetary Union with and Without Deposit Insurance Schemes," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 237-256, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:openec:v:31:y:2020:i:2:d:10.1007_s11079-019-09562-6
    DOI: 10.1007/s11079-019-09562-6
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bank run; Monetary union; Euro breakup; Redenomination risk;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F30 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - General
    • F31 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Exchange
    • F41 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Open Economy Macroeconomics
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises

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