A comment on "salaries or piece rates: on the endogenous matching of harvest workers and crops"
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More about this item
Keywords
Incentives; Ability; Matching; Moral Hazard;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
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