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Incentive provision to farm workers in post-socialist settings: Evidence from East Germany and North Kazakhstan

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  • Petrick, Martin

Abstract

This article explores the current practice of motivating agricultural workers in post-socialist settings. In addition, it attempts to evaluate the different wage systems observed in reality and better understand under which conditions they are reformed. It does so by contrasting the experience of two extreme cases representing fast and slow reform advance, East Germany and North Kazakhstan. The primary data for the analysis comes from cross-sectional farm surveys conducted by various researchers in both countries. East German farmers quickly replaced the inherited Soviet-style piece rate payment system by simple time rate schemes, augmented by wage premia for certain performance parameters, especially in livestock. To the contrary, the piece rate approach persists in many farms in North Kazakhstan. Moreover, the latter rarely use non-wage incentives to motivate their workers. In Kazakhstan, farms using either mixed systems or pure piece rates were more productive than the reference group using pure time rates. Labour cost per worker were lowest for pure time rate systems in both countries, followed by mixed bonus systems, whereas pure piece rate systems implied the highest cost in Kazakhstan. Kazakhstani managers tend to move away from the Soviet piece rate system if external investors become engaged in farming operations.
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  • Petrick, Martin, 2016. "Incentive provision to farm workers in post-socialist settings: Evidence from East Germany and North Kazakhstan," 155th Seminar, September 19-21, 2016, Kiev, Ukraine 245171, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
  • Handle: RePEc:ags:eaa155:245171
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.245171
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    Cited by:

    1. Kvartiuk, Vasyl & Petrick, Martin, 2021. "Liberal land reform in Kazakhstan? The effect on land rental and credit markets," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 138(C).
    2. Gagalyuk, Taras & Meyers, William H. & Balmann, Alfons, 2021. "Editorial. Special Issue: Growth of agroholdings and mega-farms in transition and emerging market economies: Institutional and organizational aspects," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 24(4), pages 581-592.
    3. Gagalyuk, Taras & Meyers, William H. & Balmann, Alfons, 2021. "Editorial," International Food and Agribusiness Management Review, International Food and Agribusiness Management Association, vol. 24(4), May.
    4. Hermans, Frans L. P. & Chaddad, Fabio R. & Gagalyuk, Taras & Senesi, Sebastian & Balmann, Alfons, 2017. "The emergence and proliferation of agroholdings and mega farms in a global context," International Food and Agribusiness Management Review, International Food and Agribusiness Management Association, vol. 20(2), April.
    5. Gagalyuk, T., 2018. "A resilience-based rationale for farm growth: the case of Ukrainian agroholdings," 2018 Conference, July 28-August 2, 2018, Vancouver, British Columbia 277115, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
    6. Taras Gagalyuk, 2017. "Project Review: International Competence Center on Large Scale Agriculture at the Leibniz Institute of Agricultural Development in Transition Economies," Journal of Applied Management and Investments, Department of Business Administration and Corporate Security, International Humanitarian University, vol. 6(2), pages 147-150, May.
    7. Petrick, Martin & Götz, Linde, 2017. "The expansion of dairy herds in Russia and Kazakhstan after the import ban on Western food products," 57th Annual Conference, Weihenstephan, Germany, September 13-15, 2017 261996, German Association of Agricultural Economists (GEWISOLA).
    8. Yuan, Lingran & Zhang, Qizheng & Wang, Shuo & Hu, Weibin & Gong, Binlei, 2022. "Effects of international trade on world agricultural production and productivity: evidence from a panel of 126 countries 1962-2014," International Food and Agribusiness Management Review, International Food and Agribusiness Management Association, vol. 25(2), March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Labor and Human Capital;

    JEL classification:

    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
    • P32 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Collectives; Communes; Agricultural Institutions
    • Q12 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Micro Analysis of Farm Firms, Farm Households, and Farm Input Markets

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