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Rent-seeking contest with two forms of sabotaging efforts

Author

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  • Yizhaq Minchuk

    (Department of Industrial Engineering and Management, Shamoon College of Engineering, Israel.)

Abstract

We study standard rent-seeking contests in which there are two forms of sabotaging. This study is conducted for a symmetric model of two contestants with complete information, when the first form of sabotaging negatively affects the probability of winning the contest while the second form increases the marginal cost of the standard rent-seeking effort. We show that only those forms of sabotage that increase the marginal cost of the rent-seeking effort affect the productive rent-seeking effort. Thus, from a designer's point of view, if monitoring is feasible, the only form of sabotaging effort that should be monitored is the second one.

Suggested Citation

  • Yizhaq Minchuk, 2020. "Rent-seeking contest with two forms of sabotaging efforts," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 40(2), pages 1413-1419.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-20-00180
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    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2020/Volume40/EB-20-V40-I2-P121.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Konrad, Kai A., 2009. "Strategy and Dynamics in Contests," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199549603.
    2. Bernhardt, Dan & Ghosh, Meenakshi, 2020. "Positive and negative campaigning in primary and general elections," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 98-104.
    3. Subhasish Chowdhury & Oliver Gürtler, 2015. "Sabotage in contests: a survey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 164(1), pages 135-155, July.
    4. Fu, Qiang & Lu, Jingfeng, 2009. "Contest with pre-contest investment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 103(3), pages 142-145, June.
    5. Kai A. Konrad, 2000. "Sabotage in Rent-Seeking Contests," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Arye L. Hillman & Kai A. Konrad (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, pages 409-419, Springer.
    6. Skaperdas, Stergios & Grofman, Bernard, 1995. "Modeling Negative Campaigning," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 89(1), pages 49-61, March.
    7. Roger D. Congleton & Arye L. Hillman (ed.), 2015. "Companion to the Political Economy of Rent Seeking," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 15325.
    8. Serhat Doğan & Kerim Keskin & Çağrı Sağlam, 2019. "Sabotage in team contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 180(3), pages 383-405, September.
    9. Lazear, Edward P, 1989. "Pay Equality and Industrial Politics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(3), pages 561-580, June.
    10. Yizhaq Minchuk & Baruch Keren & Yossi Hadad, 2018. "Sabotaging in contests with monitoring efforts," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 39(6), pages 674-681, September.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Yizhaq Minchuk, 2021. "Reimbursement as a tool to reduce sabotaging in rent‐seeking contests," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 42(1), pages 235-238, January.
    2. Chung, A., 2024. "Target Setting in Contests with Sabotage," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2409, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Rent-seeking contests; sabotaging;

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

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