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Sabotaging in contests with monitoring efforts

Author

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  • Yizhaq Minchuk
  • Baruch Keren
  • Yossi Hadad

Abstract

This paper considers a 3‐stage contest with both sabotage and monitoring efforts that aim to reduce sabotage. In the first stage, the regulator sets his monitoring efforts for each contestant. In the second stage, each contestant determines his sabotaging efforts, based on the monitoring efforts that were imposed by the regulator. In the third stage, each contestant determines his productive efforts in the contest. The results supply a justification to exert monitoring efforts because these efforts may benefit both the contestants and the regulator (a win‐win situation). Furthermore, the paper defines the conditions where exerting monitoring efforts would be worthwhile.

Suggested Citation

  • Yizhaq Minchuk & Baruch Keren & Yossi Hadad, 2018. "Sabotaging in contests with monitoring efforts," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 39(6), pages 674-681, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:39:y:2018:i:6:p:674-681
    DOI: 10.1002/mde.2937
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    Cited by:

    1. Yizhaq Minchuk, 2020. "Rent-seeking contest with two forms of sabotaging efforts," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 40(2), pages 1413-1419.
    2. Yizhaq Minchuk, 2021. "Reimbursement as a tool to reduce sabotaging in rent‐seeking contests," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 42(1), pages 235-238, January.
    3. Klunover, Doron, 2023. "Punishment for sabotage in dynamic tournaments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(C).

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