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Exclusionary bundle discounts: A simple model with two applications

Author

Listed:
  • C.-Philipp Heller

    (NERA Economic Consulting)

  • Heiner Lindenlaub

    (NERA Economic Consulting)

  • Frank P Maier-Rigaud

    (NERA Economic Consulting and IESEG (LEM-CNRS))

Abstract

We develop a simple theoretical model of exclusionary bundle discounts. Based on the model, we develop a screening test for exclusionary bundle discounts. This test only requires knowledge of prices and an estimate of the coverage of the bundle discount. We apply this test to the Vodafone/Liberty Global merger in Germany and find bundle discounts in the German broadband Internet access market consistent with exclusion. We finally use the model to simulate the merger's price effects.

Suggested Citation

  • C.-Philipp Heller & Heiner Lindenlaub & Frank P Maier-Rigaud, 2020. "Exclusionary bundle discounts: A simple model with two applications," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 40(1), pages 210-216.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-19-00661
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    exclusionary pricing; bundling; mergers;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
    • L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies

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