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Árprés és felfaló árazás. Közgazdasági elmélet, bírói, szabályozói gyakorlat
[Price squeezing and predatory pricing. Economic theory and judicial and regulatory practice]

Author

Listed:
  • Valentiny, Pál

Abstract

A cikk a felfaló árazás és az árprés fogalmának, közgazdasági hátterének bemutatására, valamint annak vizsgálatára vállalkozik, hogy ezekre hivatkozással milyen bírói gyakorlat alakult ki, milyen szabályozói beavatkozások történtek. A felfaló árazás és az árprés vizsgálatának kérdése az utóbbi időben többek között azért került előtérbe, mert a hálózatos közszolgáltatások liberalizálása óta eltelt idő alatt világossá vált, hogy sok területen a liberalizáció, a kizárólagos jogok felszámolása önmagában nem elegendő a verseny kívánatos mértékének eléréséhez. A liberalizációt követően az Európai Unióban jogi formát is öltött az a felismerés, hogy a jövőben az ágazati és a versenyszabályozásnak új, a korábbinál egymásra utaltabb és együttműködőbb viszonyát kell kialakítani. A szabályozási változások iránya kettős, egyfelől az ágazati szabályozásban a korábbinál nagyobb hangsúlyt kapnak a versenyszabályozás elvei, másfelől egyes versenyszabályozási kérdésekben - vállalatfelvásárlások, összeolvadások, versenykorlátozások - várhatóan megnő az ágazati szakértők szerepe. A szabályozási reformoknak ugyanakkor közös vonása, hogy a megalapozott szabályozói döntések egyre sokrétűbb elemzést igényelnek, és ezen belül egyre fontosabb szerepet játszanak a közgazdasági elemzések. Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) kód: K21, K23, L51, L97.

Suggested Citation

  • Valentiny, Pál, 2004. "Árprés és felfaló árazás. Közgazdasági elmélet, bírói, szabályozói gyakorlat [Price squeezing and predatory pricing. Economic theory and judicial and regulatory practice]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(1), pages 24-45.
  • Handle: RePEc:ksa:szemle:658
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 2001. "Competition in Telecommunications," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262621509, April.
    2. Sibley, David S. & Weisman, Dennis L., 1998. "Raising rivals' costs: The entry of an upstream monopolist into downstream markets," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 451-470, December.
    3. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1986. "A "Signal-Jamming" Theory of Predation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(3), pages 366-376, Autumn.
    4. McGee, John S, 1980. "Predatory Pricing Revisited," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(2), pages 289-330, October.
    5. Kreps, David M. & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Reputation and imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 253-279, August.
    6. Lott, Jr. John R., 1999. "Are Predatory Commitments Credible?," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 1, number 9780226493558, January.
    7. Baumol, William J, 1996. "Predation and the Logic of the Average Variable Cost Test," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(1), pages 49-72, April.
    8. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1982. "Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 280-312, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Valentiny, Pál & Kiss, Károly Miklós, 2009. "A nélkülözhetetlen eszközök értelmezése és a postai szolgáltatások [The interpretation of essential facilities and the postal services]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(11), pages 1001-1024.
    2. Bara, Zoltán, 2007. "A közgazdasági elemzés szerepe a kiszorító/felfaló árazás vizsgálatában. Az Európa Bíróság France Télécom-ügyben hozott ítéletének hatásai [The role of economic analysis in predatory pricing cases.," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(9), pages 800-820.
    3. Valentiny, Pál, 2019. "Közgazdaságtan a jogalkalmazásban [Forensic economics]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(2), pages 134-162.
    4. Erdélyi, Márk, 2006. "Felfaló árazás. Árazás a versenytárs megsemmisítésére [Predatory prices. Pricing designed to annihilate competitors]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(4), pages 365-379.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L97 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Utilities: General

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