Inducing e-waste sorting investment under imperfect information
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More about this item
Keywords
E-waste; imperfect information; international trade; market;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- Q5 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
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