On information acquisition by buyers and information disclosure by sellers
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DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.01.010
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- Rodivilov, Alexander, 2021. "A note on robust procurement contracts," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).
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More about this item
Keywords
Information acquisition; Information disclosure; Pricing;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
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