Radner's Theorem on Teams and Games with a Continuum of Players
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References listed on IDEAS
- Takashi Ui, 2009. "Bayesian potentials and information structures: Team decision problems revisited," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 5(3), pages 271-291, September.
- Antoni Calvo-Armengol & Joan de Marti Beltran, 2009. "Information Gathering in Organizations: Equilibrium, Welfare, and Optimal Network Structure," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 7(1), pages 116-161, March.
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Cited by:
- Ui, Takashi & 宇井, 貴志, 2019. "The Lucas Imperfect Information Model with Imperfect Common Knowledge," Discussion Papers 2019-04, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
- Masaki Miyashita & Takashi Ui, 2024. "On the Pettis Integral Approach to Large Population Games," Papers 2403.17605, arXiv.org.
- Ui, Takashi & Yoshizawa, Yasunori, 2015. "Characterizing social value of information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PB), pages 507-535.
- Ryo Kato & Tatsushi Okuda, 2017. "Market Concentration and Sectoral Inflation under Imperfect Common Knowledge," IMES Discussion Paper Series 17-E-11, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan.
- Takashi Ui, 2022. "Optimal and Robust Disclosure of Public Information," Papers 2203.16809, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2022.
- Takashi Ui, 2022. "Optimal and Robust Disclosure of Public Information," Working Papers on Central Bank Communication 039, University of Tokyo, Graduate School of Economics.
- Takashi Ui, 2019. "The Lucas Imperfect Information Model with Imperfect Common Knowledge," Working Papers on Central Bank Communication 007, University of Tokyo, Graduate School of Economics.
- Takashi Ui, 2020. "The Lucas imperfect information model with imperfect common knowledge," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 71(1), pages 85-100, January.
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More about this item
Keywords
unique linear equilibrium; Bayesian potential game; team.;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
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