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On the Pettis Integral Approach to Large Population Games

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  • Masaki Miyashita
  • Takashi Ui

Abstract

The analysis of large population economies with incomplete information often entails the integration of a continuum of random variables. We showcase the usefulness of the integral notion \`a la Pettis (1938) to study such models. We present several results on Pettis integrals, including convenient sufficient conditions for Pettis integrability and Fubini-like exchangeability formulae, illustrated through a running example. Building on these foundations, we conduct a unified analysis of Bayesian games with arbitrarily many heterogeneous agents. We provide a sufficient condition on payoff structures, under which the equilibrium uniqueness is guaranteed across all signal structures. Our condition is parsimonious, as it turns out necessary when strategic interactions are undirected. We further identify the moment restrictions, imposed on the equilibrium action-state joint distribution, which have crucial implications for information designer's problem of persuading a population of strategically interacting agents. To attain these results, we introduce and develop novel mathematical tools, built on the theory of integral kernels and reproducing kernel Hilbert spaces in functional analysis.

Suggested Citation

  • Masaki Miyashita & Takashi Ui, 2024. "On the Pettis Integral Approach to Large Population Games," Papers 2403.17605, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2403.17605
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    References listed on IDEAS

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