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Information Gathering in Organizations: Equilibrium, Welfare, and Optimal Network Structure

Author

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  • Antoni Calvo-Armengol
  • Joan de Marti Beltran

Abstract

We model an organization as a game in which all agents share a common decision problem and some level of coordination is necessary between individual actions. Agents have individual private information concerning the task they have to perform, and they share this private information through pairwise channels of communication. We analyze how this communication pattern, modeled by means of a network structure, affects individual behavior and aggregate welfare. In the unique equilibrium of this Bayesian game, each agent's optimal action depends on a properly defined knowledge index that measures how the aggregation of information helps him to infer higher-order beliefs about other's information after communication. Adding communication channels is not always beneficial for the organization because it can lead to mis-coordination. We single out the geometry of interagent communication links that the manager could implement in order to improve the organization's performance.

Suggested Citation

  • Antoni Calvo-Armengol & Joan de Marti Beltran, 2009. "Information Gathering in Organizations: Equilibrium, Welfare, and Optimal Network Structure," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 7(1), pages 116-161, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:tpr:jeurec:v:7:y:2009:i:1:p:116-161
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen, 2017. "Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 744-759.
    2. Takashi Ui & Yasunori Yoshizawa, 2013. "Radner's Theorem on Teams and Games with a Continuum of Players," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(1), pages 72-77.
    3. Wataru Tamura, 2012. "A Theory of Multidimensional Information Disclosure," ISER Discussion Paper 0828, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    4. Hagenbach, Jeanne & Koessler, Frédéric, 2016. "Full disclosure in decentralized organizations," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 5-7.
    5. M. Koenig & Claudio J. Tessone & Yves Zenou, "undated". "A Dynamic Model of Network Formation with Strategic Interactions," Working Papers CCSS-09-006, ETH Zurich, Chair of Systems Design.
    6. Robert Akerlof & Richard Holden, 2016. "Movers and Shakers," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 131(4), pages 1849-1874.
    7. Akerlof, Robert & Holden, Richard, 2017. "Network Capital," CEPR Discussion Papers 11763, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Leister, C. Matthew, 2020. "Information acquisition and welfare in network games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 453-475.
    9. Keiichi Morimoto, 2009. "Optimal Structure of Monetary Policy Committees," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 09-36-Rev, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics, revised Dec 2009.
    10. Di Maggio, Marco, 2009. "Accountability and Cheap Talk," MPRA Paper 18652, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Torun Dewan & David P Myatt, 2012. "On the rhetorical strategies of leaders: Speaking clearly, standing back, and stepping down," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 24(4), pages 431-460, October.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading

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