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Dealing with aversion to the sucker's payoff in public goods games

Author

Listed:
  • Douadia Bougherara

    (INRA, UMR1302, F-35000 Rennes, France)

  • Sandrine Costa

    (INRA-ENGREF, UMR0356, F-54000 Nancy, France)

  • Gilles Grolleau

    (INRA-SUPAGRO, UMR1135, F-34000 Montpellier, France)

  • Lisette Ibanez

    (INRA, UMR1135, F-34000 Montpellier, France)

Abstract

A usual explanation to low levels of contribution to public goods is the fear of getting the sucker's payoff (cooperation by the participant and defection by the other players). In order to disentangle the effect of this fear from other motives, we design a public good game where people have an insurance against getting the sucker's payoff. We show that contributions to the public good under this ‘protective' design are significantly higher and interact with expectations on other individuals' contribution to the public good. Some policy implications and extensions are suggested.

Suggested Citation

  • Douadia Bougherara & Sandrine Costa & Gilles Grolleau & Lisette Ibanez, 2009. "Dealing with aversion to the sucker's payoff in public goods games," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 29(4), pages 3194-3202.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-09-00730
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Kate Farrow & Gilles Grolleau & Lisette Ibanez, 2017. "Designing more effective norm interventions: the role of valence," Post-Print hal-01680539, HAL.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Experiments; Public good; Sucker's payoff; Assurance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods

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