IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eaa/aeinde/v19y2019i2_2.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Duration Of Trade Agreement Negotiations

Author

Listed:
  • Lizzette ARROYO
  • Ramon A. CASTILLO-PONCE

Abstract

In this document we analyze the factors that influence the length of trade agreement negotiations. We consider economic and sociopolitical determinants and conduct the exercise estimating Cox-proportional hazard models. We find that divergence in the economic size or growth tends to expedite trade talks. This is also true for differences in trade openness. Political factors, on the other hand, prolong the implementation of trade agreements. Specifically, trade negotiations stall as countries adopt more radical political positions; opposite to their potential trading partners. This last result is particularly relevant in today’s trade environment, where a shift in political preferences in countries like the US and Great Brittan has created a wedge between these countries and their main trading partners.

Suggested Citation

  • Lizzette ARROYO & Ramon A. CASTILLO-PONCE, 2019. "The Duration Of Trade Agreement Negotiations," Applied Econometrics and International Development, Euro-American Association of Economic Development, vol. 19(2), pages 19-36.
    • Handle: RePEc:eaa:aeinde:v:19:y:2019:i:2_2
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.usc.es/~economet/reviews/aeid1922.pdf
    Download Restriction: No.
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rose, Andrew K. & Moser, Christoph, 2012. "Why Do Trade Negotiations Take So Long?," Journal of Economic Integration, Center for Economic Integration, Sejong University, vol. 27, pages 280-290.
    2. Florian Mölders, 2012. "On the Path to Trade Liberalization: Political Regimes in International Trade Negotiations," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1245, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    3. Anonymous, 1950. "International Trade Organization," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 4(1), pages 136-138, February.
    4. Mansfield, Edward D. & Pevehouse, Jon C., 2000. "Trade Blocs, Trade Flows, and International Conflict," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 54(4), pages 775-808, October.
    5. Anonymous, 1950. "International Trade Organization," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 4(4), pages 681-682, November.
    6. Anonymous, 1950. "International Trade Organization," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 4(3), pages 494-497, August.
    7. Richard Baldwin, 1993. "A Domino Theory of Regionalism," NBER Working Papers 4465, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Edward D. Mansfield & Helen V. Milner & B. Peter Rosendorff, 2015. "Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Edward D Mansfield (ed.), THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, chapter 11, pages 227-263, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    9. John Whalley, 2008. "Recent Regional Agreements: Why So Many, Why So Much Variance in Form, Why Coming So Fast, and Where Are They Headed?," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(4), pages 517-532, April.
    10. Edward D. Mansfield, 1998. "The Proliferation of Preferential Trading Arrangements," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 42(5), pages 523-543, October.
    11. Anonymous, 1950. "International Trade Organization," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 4(2), pages 325-326, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Chao, N.H. & Chang, C.F. & Chang, E.Y., 2002. "Responding to globalization trends in fisheries: assets of professional Taiwanese women," Monographs, The WorldFish Center, number 36248, April.
    2. Donges, Juergen B., 1987. "Trade protectionism and international monetary order: Recalling the relevance of past experience," Kiel Working Papers 304, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    3. Arnade, Carlos & Grigsby, Elaine, 1988. "Foreign Borrowing and Agricultural Trade of Major Latin American Debtors," Staff Reports 278010, United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.
    4. Hiemstra, Stephen W., 1987. "Effect Of Spain'S Entry Into The European Community On The Demand For Imported Corn," Staff Reports 277993, United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.
    5. Gilbert Noël, 1988. "La participation de la France aux stratégies d'organisation internationale de l'agriculture," Économie rurale, Programme National Persée, vol. 184(1), pages 63-70.
    6. Kaman Nainggolan, 1988. "Macroeconomic Impacts on Indonesian Agricultural Exports," Economics and Finance in Indonesia, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Indonesia, vol. 36, pages 163-189, Juni.
    7. Elaine Hartwick & Richard Peet, 2003. "Neoliberalism and Nature: The Case of the WTO," The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, , vol. 590(1), pages 188-211, November.
    8. Florian Mölders, 2012. "On the Path to Trade Liberalization: Political Regimes in International Trade Negotiations," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1245, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    9. Edward D. Mansfield & Helen V. Milner & Jon C. Pevehouse, 2008. "Democracy, Veto Players and the Depth of Regional Integration," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(1), pages 67-96, January.
    10. Andreas Dür & Leonardo Baccini & Manfred Elsig, 2014. "The design of international trade agreements: Introducing a new dataset," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 353-375, September.
    11. Florian Mölders, 2016. "On the Path to Trade Liberalisation: Political Regimes in Trade Negotiations," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(7), pages 890-924, July.
    12. Florian Mölders & Ulrich Volz, 2011. "Trade creation and the status of FTAs: empirical evidence from East Asia," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 147(3), pages 429-456, September.
    13. Vicard, Vincent, 2012. "Trade, conflict, and political integration: Explaining the heterogeneity of regional trade agreements," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 54-71.
    14. Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & Jana von Stein & Erik Gartzke, 2008. "International Organizations Count," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 52(2), pages 175-188, April.
    15. Hadjiyiannis, Costas & Heracleous, Maria S. & Tabakis, Chrysostomos, 2016. "Regionalism and conflict: Peace creation and peace diversion," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 141-159.
    16. Aaronson Susan Ariel & Abouharb M. Rodwan & Daniel Wang K., 2015. "The Liberal Illusion Is Not a Complete Delusion: The WTO Helps Member States Keep the Peace Only When It Increases Trade," Global Economy Journal, De Gruyter, vol. 15(4), pages 455-484, December.
    17. Keith W. Hipel & Amer Obeidi, 2005. "Trade versus the environment: Strategic settlement from a systems engineering perspective," Systems Engineering, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 8(3), pages 211-233, September.
    18. Baldwin, Richard & Jaimovich, Dany, 2012. "Are Free Trade Agreements contagious?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 1-16.
    19. Tim Büthe & Helen V. Milner, 2008. "The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment into Developing Countries: Increasing FDI through International Trade Agreements?," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 52(4), pages 741-762, October.
    20. Baccini, Leonardo & Dür, Andreas & Elsig, Manfred & Milewicz, Karolina, 2011. "The design of preferential trade agreements: A new dataset in the Making," WTO Staff Working Papers ERSD-2011-10, World Trade Organization (WTO), Economic Research and Statistics Division.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Trade; Negotiation; Duration.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • F14 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Empirical Studies of Trade
    • F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eaa:aeinde:v:19:y:2019:i:2_2. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: M. Carmen Guisan (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.usc.es/economet/eaa.htm .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.